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LEAVE AS AN ACCOMMODATION: WHEN IS
ENOUGH, ENOUGH?1
STACY A. HICKOX* AND JOSEPH M. GUZMAN**
ABSTRACT
The right to reasonable accommodations under the Americans with
Disabilities Act includes leave that will enable an employee with a
disability to return to work rather than being discharged. This right may
seem unreasonable for an employer needing employees to be at work to
be productive, raising the question of when leave as an accommodation
becomes unreasonable or imposes an undue hardship on an employer. In
the absence of specific guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit
courts apply a variety of approaches, ranging from individualized analysis
to determinations that any leave exceeding some number of weeks is
unreasonable. In this paper, three hundred and fifty-three decisions
addressing this question have been analyzed to determine which factors
are determinative of reasonableness, including factors identified in the
various approaches of the circuit courts as well as those which economists
would use to determine the value of an employee and the cost of replacing
that employee.
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Most employees need to be present at work to perform their jobs. At the same
time, employees with disabilities have the right to reasonable accommodation under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The unavailability of accommodations
has been identified as a significant barrier to the full employment of people with
disabilities.2 But does reasonable accommodation include an employer’s toleration
of leave from work? Discrimination prohibited by the ADA includes an employer’s
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified . . . employee,” unless the employer can show
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s
operations.3
Reasonable accommodation can include absences or leave from work, according
to both the federal courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).4 The duty of accommodation was included in the ADA to provide
unemployed persons with disabilities an opportunity to work and retain a position
once hired.5 Leave as an accommodation may be essential for employees with
disabilities who need time off for treatment or to wait for remission of symptoms
that prevent them from working.6 To enforce this right to accommodation, the EEOC
has been targeting employers with leave policies that result in the discharge of

2

David C. Baldridge & Michele L. Swift, Withholding Requests for Disability
Accommodation: The Role of Individual Differences and Disability Attributes, 39 J. MGT. 743,
744 (2013).
3

42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (West 2014).

4

EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [hereinafter EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
5
See John R. Autry, Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA: Are Employers
Required to Participate in the Interactive Process? The Courts Say “Yes” but the Law Says
“No”, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 665, 666 (2004); Amy Renee Brown, Note, Mental Disabilities
Under the ADA: The Role of Employees and Employers in the Interactive Process, 8 WASH.
U. J. L. & POL’Y 341 (2002) (ADA “promise[s] a bright future of inclusion and integration for
individuals with disabilities” by “adding them into the mainstream of American life”).
6
See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues:
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 445 (2002).
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employees with disabilities without individual consideration of that employee’s need
for an accommodation.7
From the employer’s perspective, leave policies and the ability to discharge
absent employees are important to overall productivity, since an employee on leave
is not performing. In addition to productivity concerns, an employer’s reluctance to
grant leave as an accommodation may be based on some notion that all employees
should be treated the same, or a perceived lack of connection between the request for
leave and the employee’s disability.8 Employers may also be reluctant to grant leave
as an accommodation because leave may place a relatively greater burden on both
employers and coworkers, compared to other accommodations.9
This apparent conflict in interests between employers and employees raises the
question of where courts should draw the line on requiring at least some leave as an
accommodation for an employee with a disability; i.e., how much leave is
reasonable? As one employers’ attorney explained, employers need further guidance
on “what limitations they may place on leaves they offer and the extent of the duty to
hold an employee’s position open during the leave, while still effectively running
their businesses.”10 In addition, employers need guidance as to how to show that
leave as an accommodation would impose an undue hardship, thus relieving them of
the responsibility of providing the leave.11
Since the ADA came into effect for employers in 1992, the law defining
reasonable accommodation has been described as “woefully underdeveloped.”12 This
lack of guidance from the courts could be due to the imprecise nature of the concepts
of “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship.”13 Experts have called on the
7

See, e.g., EEOC, Truck Firm Settle for $4.85 Million Nationwide ADA Case Regarding
Leave Policy, BNA LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW RESOURCE CENTER, http://
laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com/lerc/2453/.
8
Cheryl L. Anderson, What Is “Because of the Disability” Under the Americans with
Disablities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27
BERKELY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 348, 350-51, 353 (2006) (accommodation should address
limitations arising from impairment).
9

Befort, supra note 6, at 442, 448-49.

10
Ellen McLaughlin, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of Leave as
Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
meetings/6-8-11/mclaughlin.cfm; see also Edward Isler, Statement before the EEOC Meeting
to Examine Use of Leave as Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8-11/isler.cfm (“Many aspects of the ADA, particularly
those dealing with absences purportedly necessitated by a medical condition that may or may
not qualify as a disability, remain as ambiguous and ill-defined (if not more so) than when the
law first became effective.”).
11
See Peter J. Petesch, EEOC Moves Toward Guidance Addressing Leave as a
Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA, BNA Insights (June 23, 2011), available at
http://laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com/lerc/display/story_list.adp?mode=ins&frag_id=21182
889&prod=dlln (additional guidance would benefit both employees and employers).
12
Grant T. Collins & Penelope J. Phillips, Overview of Reasonable Accommodation and
the Shifting Emphasis from Who is Disabled to Who Can Work, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 469, 472,
481 (2011).
13

Befort, supra note 6, at 441.
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EEOC to provide guidelines so that determinations about what accommodations are
reasonable can be more consistent and based on concrete, objective factors.14 Even
though EEOC held hearings on the issue of leave as an accommodation in 2011, no
specific guidance has been provided.
This lack of guidance has led to an “expectations gap” between an employee
requesting an accommodation and his or her employer, due to the ADA’s “selfconscious ambiguity about rights and responsibilities.”15 To resolve this gap, the
parties need to exchange and consider information that is relevant to the
reasonableness of the accommodation, which may include “how the impairment
operates, how it interacts with the employer’s workplace and the worker’s job, how
it might affect co-workers, and the worker’s prognosis” as well as the employer’s
information regarding production and costs.16
This exchange of information is required under the ADA’s obligation to engage
in the interactive process.17 The process should include a thorough analysis
regarding what duties are essential to the position for which an employee seeks
accommodations.18 This analysis will help the employer determine whether the
accommodation is even reasonable.
Rather than focusing on an employee’s ability to perform the essential duties of a
position, many appellate courts reviewing the reasonableness of leave as an
accommodation have focused on the length or indefiniteness of the leave request,
and have given significant deference to employers’ leave policies.19 This approach
does not take into consideration the value of a particular employee or the difficulty
of “covering” for that employee while he or she is on leave. In contrast, a smaller
number of appellate courts require that an employer demonstrate an undue hardship
caused by an employee’s use of leave, after considering the medical evidence
regarding the employee’s ability to return to work as well as the specific job duties
of the employee.20
The more individualized approach is supported by labor economists’ cost benefit
analysis, which supports consideration of an individual employee’s value to the
employer, as well as the cost of replacing that employee, when determining whether
leave is a reasonable accommodation. 21 Thus, employers should provide more leave
to employees with higher skills and greater longevity. Such analysis would also
14
Brian East, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of Leave as
Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
meetings/6-8-11/east.cfm.
15

Seth D. Harris, Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction Costs, and Mediation:
Evidence from the EEOC's Mediation Program, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008).
16

Id. at 9.

17

See 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) (2012); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d
1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1995).
18

Collins & Phillips, supra note 12, at 498-99.

19
See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text (discussion of length of leave); infra
notes 144-99 and accompanying text (discussion on indefinite leave).
20

See infra notes 272-94 and accompanying text (discussion of undue hardship defense).

21

Edward P. Lazear, Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions, 17 J. OF
LAB. ECON. 199, 223 (1999).
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support policies regarding the use of leave that are tailored to the needs of that
particular workplace, including the size of the workforce and the particular skills and
abilities required of the workforce.
This article will demonstrate how appellate courts vary significantly in their
approach to reviewing the reasonableness of leave as an accommodation. Some
guidance is provided by one Supreme Court decision that allowed deference to an
employer’s seniority policy that came into conflict with a request for a transfer as an
accommodation.22 Both before and after this decision, appellate courts have taken a
variety of approaches in addressing the question of how much leave is reasonable as
an accommodation, and when leave imposes an undue hardship on an employer.
Some courts only require leave of a definite duration, placing the burden on the
employee to provide evidence of when he or she will return to work.23 Appellate
courts also consider an employer’s policies to determine what length of leave should
be deemed reasonable, while others will require that the employer establish that the
leave will impose an undue hardship.24
Our analysis of both appellate and trial court opinions since 1992 demonstrates
that certain factors emerge as significant determinants of whether leave will be
required as a reasonable accommodation. Appellate and trial court decisions since
the passage of the ADA are reviewed and analyzed to determine what consideration
is given to the employee-related factors that would seem relevant to the questions of
reasonableness and undue hardship, including the length of the leave as well as the
person’s particular job duties, tenure with the employer, type of impairment, skill
level, and industry. The significance of the appellate courts’ emphasis on the
certainty of when the employee can be expected to be able to return to work as well
as the significance of medical evidence related to the need for leave are tested. The
impact of employers’ leave policies and the influence of the Family and Medical
Leave Act requirements are also measured. The analysis also tests the significance of
an employee’s particular job duties or responsibilities. This statistical analysis
demonstrates which factors play a significant role in the reasonableness of a
particular employee’s request for leave as an accommodation.
This detailed review of appellate decisions and analysis of decisions regarding
the reasonableness of leave as an accommodation gives employers and courts
guidance on what factors have been influential on the success of employees’ claims.
These influential factors can then be compared to the factors that should be
considered from an economic perspective in determining whether an accommodation
is reasonable or imposes an undue hardship.
I. ACCOMMODATIONS UNDER THE ADA
Accommodation is only required if it enables a person with a disability to
perform the essential functions of his or her employment position.25 For an employee
seeking leave as an accommodation, this means that the employee will not be
protected against discrimination unless the leave would at least eventually enable
22

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).

23

See infra notes 144-99 and accompanying text (discussion of indefinite leave).

24

See infra notes 228-58 and accompanying text (discussion of employer policies); infra
notes 272-94 (undue hardship defense).
25

42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
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that employee to perform his or her essential duties. An employer must take
reasonable steps to accommodate an employee’s disability unless the
accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business”
of the employer.26 Thus, accommodations can be used to preserve the employee’s
status as a “qualified individual,” but reasonableness should be assessed based on
“the needs and disability of the employee and the resources and expectations of the
employer.”27
The ADA’s accommodation requirement has been characterized as a way for
people with disabilities to overcome systemic subordination and oppression.28 Even
though non-discrimination laws generally emphasize equal treatment, the right to
reasonable accommodations provides for alterations in conditions of employment to
enable persons with disabilities to work. With this duty to accommodate, Congress
recognized that “in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently.”29
Despite this attempt, there is a lack of evidence that the ADA has “substantially
improved” the employment opportunities of persons with disabilities.30 The Bureau
of Labor Statistics reports that in 2011, persons with disabilities had a labor force
participation rate of 17.8%, compared to a participation rate of 63.6% for others.31
This shows a decrease from 2009, where the labor force participation rate for
persons with disabilities was 21.5%, compared to a participation rate of 73.7% for
others.32 Although not confirmed by research, this lower employment rate logically
26

Id. § 12112 (b)(5)(A).

27

Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable Accommodation and
Resistance under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 68 (2008) (referencing EEOC's
Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
28
Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 829-30 (2003).
29

Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1045 (2000).
30
Scott Burris & Kathryn Moss, The Employment Discrimination Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Implementation and Impact, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1,
3 (2007); David C. Stapleton et al., Has the Employment Rate of People with Disabilities
Declined?, CORNELL U. EMP. & DISABILITY INST., 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ilr.
cornell.edu/edi/publications/PB_EmpDecline.pdf; see also Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D.
Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917 (2001) (noting decline in employment among
disabled persons after passage of ADA); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law,
114 YALE L.J. 1, 19-20 (2004) (noting drop in employment rate for persons with disabilities
during the 1990s); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 693, 705 (2000) (noting that statistics show ADA led to
relative decrease in employment).
31

Persons with a Disability: Labor Force Characteristics—2011, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (June 8, 2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/disabl_06082012.htm.
32
Persons with a Disability: Labor Force Characteristics—2009, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/mroe-88nsrh/$File/Disabilities
%20Employment%202009.pdf.
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may be due at least in part to employers’ refusal to provide leave as an
accommodation, since discharge is often the alternative to extending leave as an
accommodation.
The Supreme Court has recognized the affirmative right to accommodation by
placing a fairly low burden on employees to show that a requested accommodation is
reasonable,33 which is shown if the accommodation “seems reasonable on its face.”34
An employee may be able to meet this burden by showing that other employers in
the industry provide similar accommodations or “some of the more obvious and
visible circumstances” of the employer indicating that the accommodation is
“facially practicable.”35 An accommodation may have been deemed reasonable in
“the run of cases” or in the opinion of the Job Accommodation Network, which
provides expert and confidential guidance on accommodations for employers.36 A
strict cost-benefit analysis need not support a request for an accommodation to make
it reasonable, but the cost should not be disproportionate to the benefit to the
employee with a disability. 37
Some see accommodation requirements as unwarranted preferential treatment for
employees with disabilities.38 Justice Scalia and other experts argue that the
reasonable accommodation requirement unduly restricts the discretion of
employers;39 others believe that the federal courts have narrowly defined the duty to

33
Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: U.S. Airways v. Barnett,
the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123, 144
(2003) [hereinafter Harris, Re-Thinking].
34
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02; see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent.
Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995) (enough for plaintiff to suggest plausible
accommodation).
35

Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 145.

36

East, supra note 14. See also Job Accomodation Network’s (JAN) extensive
Accommodation and Compliance Series for both general guidance (EMPLOYERS’ PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
(May 15, 2009), available at http://askjan.org/ErGuide/ErGuide.pdf) and regarding conditions
as diverse as Parkinson’s Disease (http://askjan.org/media/PD.html), hepatitis (http://askjan.
org/media/hep.html), mental health impairments (http://askjan.org/media/Psychiatric.html),
migraine headaches (http://askjan.org/media/Migraine.html), cancer (http://askjan.org/
media/Cancer.html), lupus (http://askjan.org/media/Lupus.html), and arthritis (http://
askjan.org/media/Arthritis.html).
37

Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 149-50; see also VandeZande v. Wis. Dep’t. of
Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995) (benefits of accommodation need not exceed its
costs for it to be reasonable); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1995).
38
Stewart Schwab & Steven Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace
Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2003).
39

Barnett, 535 U.S. at 418-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion
“incorrectly subjects all employer rules and practices to the requirement of reasonable
accommodation” even where the rule or practice does not work to exclude a disabled
employee because of the employee's disability); see also Thomas F. O’Neil III & Kenneth M.
Reiss, Reassigning Disabled Employees Under the ADA: Preferences Under the Guise of
Equality?, 17 LAB. LAW. 347, 360 (2001) (criticizing the approach of some courts on the
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accommodate in a way that has favored employers.40 Despite some resistance to
requiring accommodations, employers have been “reasonably responsive” to
employees’ requests for accommodation.41 Accommodations may be required where
the cost or disruption is minimal, but many employers may consider leave as a costly
and disruptive form of accommodation.
These different outlooks toward accommodation are exemplified in the debate
over how much leave should be granted as an accommodation, since an employee
obviously is not productive while on leave, but he or she could return to work as a
productive employee at the end of the leave. One court noted this quandary: “[T]he
idea of unpaid leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation presents a
troublesome problem, partly because of the oxymoronic anomaly it harbors—the
idea that allowing a disabled employee to leave a job allows him to perform that
job’s functions.”42
A. Leave as an Accommodation
If an employee cannot perform the essential duties of his or her position because
of the limitations of his or her disability, but could regain that ability in the future,
then leave may be a reasonable accommodation. Appellate courts have been
consistent in recognizing that some amount of leave may be a reasonable
accommodation, at least in some circumstances.43 This begs the question of how
much leave is reasonable.
Leave may be needed as an accommodation for various reasons: obtaining
medical treatment, recovering from an illness or episode, or receiving disabilityrelated training.44 The length of leave available as an accommodation also affects the
grounds that their interpretations of the reasonable accommodation requirement unduly limit
employer discretion).
40

Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 99, 101, 108 (1999); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and
the ADA: The Implications of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51
DRAKE L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) [hereinafter Anderson, Neutral Policies] (courts may be reluctant
to require that the employer depart from neutral policy “because they cannot get beyond
thinking about the ADA in traditional Title VII terms”).
41

Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV.
305, 307 (2008).
42

Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 185 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006).

43

See Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 443 (1st Cir.1998); Walton v. Mental Health
Ass’n. of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999) (“unpaid leave supplementing regular sick
and personal days might, under other facts, represent a reasonable accommodation”);
Haschmann v. Time Warner Ent. Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir.1998); Brannon v. Luco
Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2008); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243,
1247 (9th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 967 (10th
Cir. 2002); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1996); see
also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2012) (note discussing § 1630.2(o) and identifying leave as a
reasonable accommodation).
44
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 3.10(4)
(1992), available at http://ia600504.us.archive.org/21/items/technicalassista00unse/technical
assista00unse.pdf; EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at text preceding Q&A 17;
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opportunity for reassignment as an accommodation, since an employer is only
required to consider employees with disabilities for positions which are vacant at the
time they seek a transfer.45 Even if there is no position available for the employee
with a disability at the start of his or her leave, reassignment could still be a
reasonable accommodation if a position becomes available while that employee is
still out on a reasonable amount of leave.46
The reasonableness of leave as an accommodation can also be significant for an
employee with a disability who seeks to return to work, but the employer prefers to
offer leave as an accommodation. In that situation, the employee may seek to
establish that leave would be an unreasonable accommodation so as to force the
employer to provide some other accommodation that would enable him or her to
return to work.47 Likewise, a reasonable amount of leave could ameliorate a direct
threat posed by an employee with a disability.48 These various reasons behind
requests for leave as an accommodation explain why more than three hundred and
fifty claims have been litigated on this issue since the ADA came into effect.
B. EEOC Guidance
EEOC Guidelines recognize leave as a reasonable accommodation.49 Generally,
reasonable accommodations include “modifications or adjustments that enable an . . .
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as
are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.”50 An
employer should first try to keep the employee in his or her existing job, if a
see also Christopher Kuczynski, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of
Leave as Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/meetings/6-8-11/kuczynski.cfm.
45

See, e.g., Rehling v. City of Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000).

46

See, e.g., Rowe v. Aroostook Med. Ctr., No. 1:09-cv-182-DBH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
102969, at *39-40 (D. Me. Aug. 17, 2010) (nurse could have been reassigned to another
position in short amount of time if kept on leave); Boykin v. ATC/Vancom of Colo., L.P., 247
F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2001); Lally v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 95C4220, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19386, at *64 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1996) (employer not required to create
position as accommodation).
47

See, e.g., Hankins v. The Gap, 84 F.3d 797, 801 (6th Cir. 1996) (leave was reasonable
accommodation instead of transfer to another position); Picinich v. United Parcel Serv., 321 F.
Supp. 2d 485, 514 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (disability leave in lieu of transfer to another position
argued by employer to be reasonable accommodation); Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, No.
1:06-cv-01137, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37176, at *49-50 (W.D. Tenn. May 1, 2009) (leave
instead of providing other accommodations at work could be considered adverse action for
employee who sought to return to work); Nagel v. Husky Lima Refinery, No. 3:09CV828,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30122, at *23 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2011) (employer’s provision of
short and long term disability was reasonable accommodation).
48

See, e.g., Rose v. Laskey, 110 Fed. Appx. 136, 138 (1st Cir. 2004) (plaintiff argued that
leave would reduce threat).
49

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2013) (emphasis added).

50

Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9, p. 364 (2013) (“reasonable
accommodation requirement is best understood as a means by which barriers to . . . equal
employment opportunity . . . are removed or alleviated”).
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reasonable accommodation would enable the employee to perform the essential job
duties of that position.51 If the employee cannot perform the essential job duties, then
leave is a form of reasonable accommodation. 52
If leave is a reasonable accommodation, the burden moves to the employer to
show that the proposed accommodation would impose an undue hardship in its
particular circumstances.53 While these guidelines establish the EEOC’s position that
leave can be a reasonable accommodation if it does not impose an undue hardship,
little attention is given to the differences among employees that may affect the
reasonableness and relative cost to the employer arising from tolerating leave as an
accommodation.
C. Research on Accommodations
Research on accommodations including leave sheds some light on how
employers view their obligations under the ADA and which employees may be
benefitting from the ADA’s protections. A study of accommodations provided or
refused by employers who requested consultation from the Job Accommodation
Network (JAN) revealed a lack of significant relationship between employee
demographic and employer variables and the provision of an accommodation.54
Specifically, accommodation decisions were not related to employees’ age, gender,
education, annual salary or wages, or years with the company.55 Likewise, direct
benefit estimates were not significantly related to company size or calendar year
direct costs, but were significantly positively associated with wages.56 Employees
with higher wages likely are more expensive to replace because recruitment,
training, and start-up costs may be greater.57 In providing accommodations, the
employer avoids those costs and realizes a greater net benefit.58
Almost all employers using JAN reported that providing an accommodation
benefited the company through retention (91.6%) and/or promotion (11.3%) of a
qualified employee.59 Other direct benefits reported included eliminating the cost of
training a new employee (59.5%), saving on worker’s compensation or insurance
51

See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345
(“Efforts should be made, however, to accommodate an employee in the position that he or
she was hired to fill before reassignment is considered.”); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App.
§ 1630.2(o) (2013) (“In general, reassignment should be considered only when
accommodation within the individual's current position would pose an undue hardship [to the
employer].”); EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at 39 (“Reassignment is the
reasonable accommodation of last resort.”).
52

Id.

53

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402.

54

Helen A. Schartz et al., Symposium, Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Study of
Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917, 936 (2006).
55

Id.

56

Id. at 940.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 939.
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costs (43.0%), increasing the accommodated worker’s productivity (76.7%),
improving the accommodated worker’s attendance (53.3%), increasing the diversity
of the company (41.4%), and “other” direct benefits (20.1%).60
Other related studies have found that employers often benefit from providing
accommodations to their incumbent employees. Significantly, the benefits gained by
employers frequently outweigh their costs, meaning that accommodations benefit
employers as well as their employees with disabilities.61 An earlier JAN study
showed that both employers and individuals reported that a significant level of
limitation due to the disability could be mitigated significantly by
accommodations.62 Of the employers surveyed who had been requested to provide
an accommodation, only 8.4% decided it was not possible to accommodate the
individual without creating an undue hardship.63 Of two hundred and twelve
employers providing cost information regarding the accommodation(s) made, half
reported no cost, and another 42.0% reported that the costs incurred were one-time
only in nature, for a median cost of six hundred dollars.64
In line with these studies, an economic perspective suggests that “rational
employers should choose to accommodate their employees with disabilities because
employers will often benefit from that choice.”65 Accommodations allow employers
to retain members of their internal labor market, which preserves productivityenhancing firm-specific skills and knowledge.66 This potential led one employer
representative to suggest that length of service should be considered favorably in
determining whether a leave is a reasonable accommodation.67 At the same time, an
employee with specialized or advanced skills may not be replaced easily, through
reassignment or temporary workers, if he or she takes leave as an accommodation.68
This indispensable employee may arguably be less able to show that his or her leave
would not impose an undue burden.
Employers may also benefit from providing accommodations since the provision
of an accommodation may increase that employee’s commitment to the internal

60

Id.

61

Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Part I—Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 902-04
(1997).
62

D. J. Hendricks et al., Cost and Effectiveness of Accommodations in the Workplace:
Preliminary Results of a Nationwide Study, 25 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2005), available at
http://www.dsq-sds.org /article/view/623/800.
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Seth D. Harris, Law, Economics, and Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market, 10
U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 1, 6 (2007) [hereinafter Harris, Internal Labor].
66

Id. at 12, 53-54.

67

Isler, supra note 10.

68

Claudia Center, Statement before the EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of Leave as
Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (June 8, 2011), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/
meetings/6-8-11/center.cfm.
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labor market, which reduces turnover.69 Retention of employees through
accommodations also avoids the transaction costs associated with replacing
employees from the external labor market.70 These costs would increase if an
employer does not provide leave as an accommodation, although there may be some
costs associated with finding a temporary replacement.
To determine whether an accommodation is reasonable, economists have
suggested the development of a “reasonable accommodation cost continuum,”
ranging from “wholly efficient accommodations” to “wholly inefficient
accommodations,” which would be deemed unreasonable.71 Between those extremes,
the reasonableness of a particular accommodation may vary across different
employers.72 Some economists would allow employers to make their own
determination regarding the provision of accommodations, assuming that employers
would provide accommodations that are “utility-maximizing” under a cost-benefit
analysis.73 Others argue that laws requiring accommodations which are not “utility
maximizing” for employers may be justified by the redistributive goal of assisting
workers with disabilities or the normative goal of results-based equality for all
workers.74
Reliance on an employer’s cost-benefit analysis would only require an
accommodation if the burden on the employer were less than the potential of harm to
the employee from denying the accommodation.75 This raises the issue of how to
quantify the benefits of an accommodation as well as the difficulty of predicting
harm to the employee if the accommodation is not provided.76 Discrimination can
occur when an employer without perfect information about the characteristics of an
69

Harris, Internal Labor, supra note 65, at 35.

70

Id. at 52.

71

Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53
DUKE L.J. 79, 144-78 (2003).
72

Id. at 179.

73

Rachel Arnow-Richman, Indenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law
and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1096 (2010)
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed. 2007) (“[E]conomics is the
science of rational choice in a world . . . in which resources are limited . . . is to explore the
implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his . . . ‘self-interest.’”); Russell
Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral” Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 447 (2004) (“[T]he term
‘rational choice theory’ lacks a single, standard definition. . . . [M]ost versions of [rational
choice theory] assume, at a minimum, that individuals will use all available information to
select behaviors that maximize their expected utility.” (footnotes omitted)).
74

Arnow-Richman, supra note 73, at 1098; see also Samuel Bagenstos, The Americans
with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 957-75 (2003) (tracing
themes of “welfare reform” and the “cost saving” function of the ADA in the political
movement culminating in the statute's adoption); Amy L. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and
“Real Efficiency”: A Unified Approach, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2003) (“[T]he
ADA can be seen as a way for taxpayers to unload some of the costs of supporting the
disabled population onto employers.”).
75

Stein, supra note 71, at 113.

76

Id.
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employee with a disability bases its assessment on inaccurate “indicators” to
evaluate those individuals’ present or future performance, especially when combined
with the general assumption that employees with disabilities are less productive than
nondisabled employees.77 For an employee requesting leave as an accommodation,
the harm of no accommodation may be clear if the employee is discharged without
the accommodation, but the probability that the accommodation of additional leave
would prevent that harm is much less predictable.
Employers’ absence and disability management (ADM) practices have not been
effective in the retention of employees with disabilities. Surveyed employers
believed, on average, that their ADM practices were only a little better than “slightly
effective” in delaying or preventing exits from employment due to health conditions
or other impairments, and more than half believed that ADM practices were no more
than slightly effective in overall retention.78 Relevant to the treatment of leave as an
accommodation, consistent return to work practices were deemed one of the most
important factors in delaying or preventing exit from the workforce and improving
retention.79
Rather than focusing on individual employee characteristics, employers tend to
focus on the overall costs associated with employee absenteeism and use of leave,
stressing the real business cost of leave arising from its usage.80 A study of employee
absenteeism conducted in 2010 highlights potential costs which could be associated
with leave as an accommodation, including direct costs such as paid time off,
overtime for remaining employees covering the work of an absent employee, and
costs to engage temporary employees, as well as intangible costs such as (with
percentages of employers reporting these costs in parentheses):







Significant losses in productivity because work is completed by less
effective, temporary workers or last-minute substitutes, or overtired,
overburdened employees working overtime who may be slower and
more susceptible to error (42%)
Lower quality and less accountability for quality (59%)
Disruption of work of other employees (80%)
Increased stress on overburdened co-workers (78%)
Lower morale (63%)81

Total costs for extended absences are estimated at 2.9% of an employer’s payroll,
and a net loss in productivity per day of 16%.82 The work of extended leave users is
most often covered by co-workers (40-46% of the time, depending on type of work),
77

Id. at 128, 130.

78

Rochelle Habeck et al., Employee Retention and Integrated Disability Management
Practices as Demand Side Factors, 20 J. OCCUP. REHABIL. 443, 449 (2010).
79

Id. at 450.

80

McLaughlin, supra note 10.

81

Mercer & Kronos Inc., Survey on the Total Financial Impact of Employee Absences, at
15 (June 2010), available at http://www.kronos.com/elqNow/elqRedir.htm?ref=http
%3a%2f%2fwww.kronos.com%2fworkarea%2fDownloadAsset.aspx%3fid%3d1396%26dd%
3d1.
82

Id. at 8.
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followed by supervisors (14-23% of the time), 7-12% by floaters, 15-17% by temps
or contractors, and 0-17% by overtime work.83 The cost of hiring and training
replacement workers has been estimated at 2-4% of payroll.84 Replacement workers
were estimated to be 79% as efficient as the original worker on extended leave.85
Generally, such costs may prevent an employer “from operating its business in an
efficient and effective manner.”86 Indirect costs can lead to higher employee
turnover, which can lead to higher training costs, more quality control issues, less
accountability for quality, and less reliability.87 In particular, sporadic, unplanned
absences may create greater costs for employers.88
As an additional indirect cost, some argue that the review of requests for
accommodation should focus on the effect of accommodations on other employees.89
Arguably, leave could have some effect on other employees who may be required to
handle additional job duties.90 In several cases, courts have concluded that job
restructuring or a proposed modification of a disabled employee’s work schedule
that would result in other employees having to work longer or harder is not a
reasonable accommodation.91
To control the costs of absenteeism, many employers offer not more than
between twelve and twenty-six weeks of leave; only some specifically provide that
additional leave “may be considered as a reasonable accommodation on a case-bycase basis.”92 A maximum duration for the leave is often set by policy to provide
employers with “some level of control over their ability to manage their headcount
and business operations” and as a way to avoid discriminatory decisions.93 Some
would presume that employers choose the amount of leave allowed “based on an
analysis of how much absence from work it can bear.”94 In line with the use of leave
policies to control attendance, one study showed that absence days ranged from 4.0
to 7.2 among employers with such formal policies, whereas absent days at employers
with no formal policy ranged from 3.5 to 10.3 days.95

83

Id. at 13.

84

L. J. Bassi and M.E. Van Buren, Sharpening the Leading Edge: State of the Industry
Report (Alexandria, VA: Society for Training and Development 1999).
85

Id. at 14.

86

McLaughlin, supra note 10.

87

Id.

88

Isler, supra note 10.

89

Alex B. Long, The ADA's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent
Third Parties”, 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 870 (2003).
90

Id. at 871.

91

Id. at 878.

92

McLaughlin, supra note 10.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Mercer & Kronos Inc., supra note 81, at 17.
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Accommodations that call for adjustments in policies may meet greater
resistance from employers than other requests for accommodations. One survey
found that among private employers who made changes to leave policies to meet the
needs of employees with disabilities, 10% reported that it was “very difficult” or
“difficult” to make those changes.96 In a survey of employees who sought
accommodations, more than 40% reported requesting leave as an accommodation,
and 88.75% reported that the request was granted; however, among those whose
request was denied, 51.4% attributed the denial to an inflexible leave policy.97
These studies suggest that leave as an accommodation should be considered in
terms of the employee’s particular characteristics, such as longevity with the
company, as well as other circumstances unique to the employer involved, such as
the effect of leave usage on overall productivity and other employees. Yet employers
may not conduct such an individualized analysis willingly; instead, employers
naturally focus on the overall costs of absenteeism.98 This raises the question of
whether courts’ enforcement of the right to leave as an accommodation does or
should force employers to engage in a more individualized assessment of the effects
of leave usage.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF REQUESTS FOR LEAVE AS ACCOMMODATION
Appellate courts take a variety of approaches in reviewing the use of leave as a
reasonable accommodation. Some courts do not even reach the question of whether
leave can be a reasonable accommodation, instead finding that an absent employee is
not ever otherwise qualified.99 Even if the reasonableness of the leave is addressed,
several appellate courts focus only on the amount of leave used or requested, or the
definiteness of the amount of leave needed, to determine whether the leave would be
a reasonable accommodation.100 This approach does not consider the particular value
of the employee to the employer’s operations, or the specific direct or indirect costs
associated with that employee’s use of leave.
A second group of appellate courts may consider the employer’s leave policy or
the right to leave under the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to determine if the
96
Susanne M. Bruyere, Disability Employment Policies and Practices in Private and
Federal Sector Organizations 15 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Program on Employment
and Disability, School of Industrial and Labor Relations 2000), available at http://
digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/63/.
97
Sarah von Schrader et al., EMERGING EMPLOYMENT ISSUES FOR PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES 25-26 (Cornell University 2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1288&context=edicollect; see also Kevin McGowan,
Statement at EEOC Public Hearing on Leave As Reasonable Accommodation Under ADA,
EEOC (June 13, 2011) (summarizing testimony of Ellen McLaughlin, a partner with Seyfarth
Shaw in Chicago, available at http://www.bna.com/eeoc-holds-public-n12884902106/
(summarizing testimony of Ellen McLaughlin, a partner with Seyfarth Shaw in Chicago,
regarding employer resistance to variation from leave policies).
98

See Mercer & Kronos Inc., supra note 81.

99

See, e.g., Kempter v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., No. 13-1036, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17930,
at *12-15 (6th Cir. Aug. 26, 2013) (focus on inability to perform essential duties & lack of
other positions); Cash v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., No. 13-5467, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *10-13
(6th Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (focus on failure to request job transfer).
100

See infra notes 95-176 and accompanying text.
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leave request is reasonable.101 Often the determination of reasonableness under these
first two approaches is made on a motion for summary judgment without any
requirement that the employer demonstrate undue hardship based on the actual or
specific costs associated with that use of leave. This focus on reasonableness rather
than undue hardship on the employer has been criticized as a way for the “cycle of
discrimination” to continue “unchecked,” because such a broad basis for denying
accommodation could allow the influence of prejudices or biases against people with
disabilities.102
A third, smaller number of circuit courts focus on the hardship caused by a
particular employee’s use of leave.103 These courts may consider the amount of leave
requested, but also consider whether that leave would unduly harm the particular
employer’s operations.104 These courts may consider an employer’s leave policy or
FMLA requirements, but also require that an employer demonstrate that leave
beyond these requirements would impose an undue hardship.105 This approach
sometimes takes into account the relative value that a particular employee adds to the
organization and the costs associated with replacing them.106
Neither the Supreme Court nor the appellate courts have provided a formula for
determining what accommodations are reasonable.107 Instead, these different
approaches lead to significantly different outcomes for employees seeking leave as
an accommodation.
A. Amount of Leave
Claims of employees seeking leave as an accommodation are often dismissed
based on what the court sees as a significant period leave, or if the leave usage has
been unscheduled.108 Courts have adopted these “cut offs” even though neither the
ADA nor the EEOC guidelines indicate what amount of leave would always be
unreasonable or impose an undue hardship.109 This approach may be based on the
notion that all employees should be treated equally, regardless of their particular
position or disability. Across different courts using this approach; however, the leave
amounts deemed unreasonable may range from one week to eighteen months,
without any consideration of expectations regarding ability to return or any undue
hardship on the employer.110 Under this approach, the employer need not show that
any additional leave would be costly or even inconvenient.
101

See infra notes 231-44, 260-68 and accompanying text.

102

Basas, supra note 27, at 111-12.

103

See infra notes 272-94 and accompanying text (discussion of undue hardship).

104

See infra notes 273-96 and accompanying text.

105

See infra notes 224-97 and accompanying text.

106

See infra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.

107

Basas, supra note 27, at 77.

108

See infra notes 108-27 and accompanying text.

109

East, supra note 14; Center, supra note 68.

110

See Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999) (more than
1 week deemed unreasonable); Dudley v. Cal. Dept. of Trans., No. 99-15892, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5249, at *4-5 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2000) (6 months of leave unreasonable); Nowak v. St.
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The dismissal of claims by employees who have taken a lengthy amount of leave
may seem reasonable because of the obvious burden on their employers. However,
claims have also been dismissed even where the employee used relatively short
amounts of leave, without any proof of the costs associated with that use of leave.111
For example, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the claim of an employee of a tree service
employee who was discharged based on his absence of thirteen days, without any
showing that the employer suffered any costs or even inconvenience due to that
absence.112
As shown by this example, even a short amount of leave has justified the
dismissal of an employee who cannot perform his or her essential job duties at the
time of discharge.113 Courts adopting such a “cut off” place the burden on the
employee to establish that at the time of discharge, he or she “possessed the
necessary skills to perform his job and that he was willing and able to demonstrate
these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.”114 In an often-cited opinion, the
Fifth Circuit held that where an employee was unavailable for work at the time of his
discharge, the employer was not required to provide any additional leave as an
accommodation.115
Relying on this approach, an employer was permitted to discharge an employee
after just one week of leave, explaining that she was not a qualified individual at the
time of her discharge.116 Under this strict “otherwise qualified” approach, an
employer is not required to establish the costs of allowing additional leave.117 This
approach assumes that any absence requires the reassignment of duties to other
employees, which is generally considered to be an unreasonable expectation.118
Courts which dismiss accommodation claims based solely on an employee’s past
use of leave allow employers to assume that an employee’s past use of leave because
of a disability is indicative of future attendance at work.119 Based on this assumption,
Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998) (teacher took more than 18 months of
leave and attendance was essential to performance).
111

Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 266 Fed. App’x 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007).

112

Id.

113
See Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1002-3; Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755,
759 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995)).
114

Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003.

115

Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759.

116

Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1999); see also
Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1999) (attendance is requirement of job);
Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003), appeal after remand, 125 Fed.
App’x 704 (7th Cir. 2004) (request for additional leave to treat mental illness seen as
admission of inability to work at time of discharge).
117

Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1048.

118

Id.; see also Duello v. Buchanan Co. Bd. of Supers., 628 F.3d 968, 973-74 (8th Cir.
2010) (employer’s ability to cover previous absences does not make excuse of essential job
duties reasonable).
119

See, e.g., Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 266 Fed. App’x. 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007).
But see Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998) (no
per se rule that leave of indefinite duration could never be reasonable accommodation);
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the employer can treat any additional leave as an unreasonable accommodation. For
example, even where an employee’s attendance fell within the parameters of an
employer’s leave policy, a manufacturing plant could treat a request for one
additional week of leave as unreasonable.120 This employer could assume that the
plaintiff was “unable to regularly attend his job” after he had taken seventy weeks of
leave over a three year period; therefore, any additional leave would be “an
ineffectual gesture.”121 The court sought to protect the employer against any future
uncertainty: “[T]he employer never knows when the employee’s medical leave will
really terminate since the employee is likely to request yet another leave shortly after
returning to work following the previous leave,” allowing the employer to
“compensate for the missing employee’s frequent, yet unpredictable absences.”122
Like courts adopting a leave “cut off,” courts also dismiss claims for leave as an
accommodation based on plaintiffs’ irregular or unscheduled use of leave.123 Courts
take the position that these unscheduled absences need not be tolerated as an
accommodation, even for only a few days of work.124 Even the EEOC’s
Enforcement Guidelines indicate that an employer need not necessarily tolerate
frequent and unpredictable absences as an accommodation, if those absences impose
a strain on the employer’s operations.125 This strain can be shown by an inability to
ensure a sufficient number of employees to accomplish the work required, a failure
to meet work goals or to serve customers/clients adequately, a need to shift work to
other employees, and/or incurring significant additional costs due to overtime or
hiring temporary workers126 Similarly, courts have explained that unpredictable
absences leave an employer unable to rely on its schedule to efficiently run its
operations.127
These decisions demonstrate the low threshold that employers must meet in
many appellate courts to justify the discharge of an employee who is on a
“significant” period of leave because of his or her disability. In these courts, leave of
just a few weeks need not be provided even without any showing by the employer
Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 650 (1st Cir. 2000) (“These are
difficult, fact intensive, case-by-case analyses, ill-served by per se rules or stereotypes.”).
120

Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 928-29 (7th Cir. 2001).

121

Id. at 929.

122

Id.; see also Teague v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., No. 96-15401, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
7618, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 12, 1997) (use of 7 months of leave indicated inability to return to
work after any additional leave).
123
Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999) (unpredictable days off need
not be accommodated); Wilson v. State Ins. Fund ex rel. Okla., No. 96-6100, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 602, at *6 (10th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997) (frequent, unauthorized, & prolonged absences
made plaintiff unqualified); Berkey v. Henderson, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1192 (S.D. Iowa
2000) (burdensome for employer to assign another employee to compensate for unpredictable
tardiness).
124

Fisher v. Vizioncore, Inc., 429 Fed. App’x 613, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2011).

125

EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4.

126

Id.

127

Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 682 (8th Cir. 2001).
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that the leave would interfere with its operations or otherwise impose any specific
costs on the employer. It is also noteworthy that none of these courts considered the
tenure of the employee with the employer or their specific skills, which would have a
direct relationship to the indirect costs on the employer due to extending the leave
compared to retaining the employee for some additional period of time.
B. Leave Would Not Result in Qualification
Under the ADA’s requirement that a claimant be otherwise qualified for the
position in question, employers are expected to provide alterations of the work
environment that will facilitate performance of the person’s essential work duties.128
This means that leave may be a reasonable accommodation for an employee who is
unable to perform his or her essential job duties for a limited period of time.129 Yet
courts will not require that an employer provide leave as an accommodation if the
employee cannot provide any assurance that he or she will be able to return anytime
in the future.130
Past use of leave has been used by an employer or a court to predict that an
employee will be unable to return to work even if leave were provided as an
accommodation, rendering any additional leave unreasonable.131 For example, the
claim of a municipality employee was dismissed based in large part on her absence
from 19-56% of her scheduled work time over a period of three years.132 The
absences forced the employer to change her work schedule and reassign some of her
work, but the use of leave did not impose any direct costs on the municipality since
the leave was unpaid after she exhausted her sick and annual leave.133 Without any
evidence of the specific indirect costs the municipality incurred due to those

128

Schartz et al., supra note 54, at 936.

129

See, e.g., Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding that leave of additional 2-4 weeks, based on physician’s opinion that symptoms
would be “short lived,” could be reasonable); Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d
1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647 (1st
Cir. 2000).
130

See, e.g., Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding
that plaintiff was unable to assure that he “likely would have been able to work” at the end of
that period).
131

See, e.g., Trujillo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 330 F. App’x 137, 139 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding
that past use of leave had not improved attendance); Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843,
848-49 (8th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claim of employee with 40 absences within 70 days of
scheduled work after she suffered an injury at work but was expected to return 27 days later);
Tubbs v. Formica Corp., 107 F. App’x 485 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that 14 leaves of absence
over 23 years of employment showed that additional leave would not allow future return to
work); Vice v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 113 F. App’x 854, 856 (10th Cir. 2004)
(finding that no additional leave was required beyond 9 months to treat anxiety & depression);
Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 211-14 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that previous
leaves had not improved attendance).
132

Colon-Fontanez v. Mun. of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 43-44 (1st Cir. 2011).

133

Id. at 24.
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absences, the court dismissed her claim because her past use of leave had not led to
any improvement in her attendance.134
Even short periods of leave may be enough to deny further leave as an
accommodation, based on predictions about the employee’s inability to return to
work at the end of the leave.135 Under this approach, employees could not show that
one and two months of leave, respectively, were reasonable.136 An additional month
of leave was not required for additional addiction treatment where the first treatment
was unsuccessful, since the employer was only “judged on what it knew at the time
or could reasonably foresee” at the time of the employee’s discharge.137 Similarly, an
employee with cancer could not show that he would have been able to return to work
at the end of an additional two months of leave,138 while the employer was not
required to show that his additional absence from work would impose any particular
costs on that large employer.139 Accordingly, courts have dismissed claims of
employees seeking leave despite their assurances that the leave would enable them to
work in the future.140
These decisions demonstrate that employers are free to make assumptions about
an employee’s future recovery. For example, additional leave was unreasonable for
an employee who had refused to follow her treatment recommendations in the past,
based on the employer’s assumption that no accommodation would assist in
managing her mental illness so as to prevent future absences from work.141
This approach places the entire burden of producing evidence of an ability to
return to work on the employee seeking an accommodation. A much more limited
number of courts require that the employer show that some limited amount of leave
would not enable the person to return to work.142 This approach prevents an
employer from relying solely on its assumption that the employee will not be able to
perform his or her job duties after the leave.143 These courts recognize the reality that
134

Id. at 43; see also Paleologos v. Rehab Consultants, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1460, 1467 (N.D.
Ga. 1998) (finding 6 weeks of leave unlikely to enable to return to work where plaintiff
alleged that management style caused stress reaction).
135

Evans v. Fed. Express Corp., 133 F.3d 137, 140 (1st Cir. 1998); Hamm v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 223 F. App’x 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2007).
136

Evans, 133 F.3d at 140; Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508.

137

Evans, 133 F.3d at 140; Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508.

138

Evans, 133 F.3d at 140 (citing Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591,
601 (7th Cir. 1998)); Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508 (citing Haschmann, 151 F.3d at 601); see
also Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that employee was
unable to work 46 days in 6 month period as well as 5 months after discharge date); Jovanovic
v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that
employee who missed 24 days in 12 months could not show that he was qualified to meet
attendance requirements of position).
139

Evans, 133 F.3d at 140; Hamm, 223 F. App’x at 508.

140

Corder v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 926-28 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that
employee had taken 18 months of leave).
141

Tubbs v. Formica Corp., 107 F. App’x 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2004).

142

See infra notes 272-94 and accompanying text (discussion of undue burden).

143

Befort, supra note 6, at 461.
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leave may be necessary to give the employee time to show that, in the future, he or
she will become able to perform his or her duties again.
C. Indefinite Leave is Unreasonable
Employees with disabilities who cannot predict the amount of leave needed find
it difficult, if not impossible, to establish that any additional leave would be a
reasonable accommodation. Like the employee who cannot establish that leave will
ever enable his or her future return to work, this indefiniteness regarding the length
of leave needed will often doom a request for leave, even if the employee has not
used significant amounts of leave in the past.144 The EEOC agrees that an employer
has no obligation to provide leave of an indefinite duration as an accommodation.145
Even if the leave is deemed reasonable, an employer can establish an undue hardship
if the indefinite nature of the leave of absence would not allow the employer to plan
for the employee’s return or permanently fill the position.146 Indefinite leave is
distinguished by the EEOC from a leave request with an approximate date of return,
which could be considered reasonable and could be reconsidered if that date changes
or becomes less definite.147
Under this approach, courts typically will not require that an employer establish
that an indefinite period of leave would impose any specific costs or inconvenience
for that organization.148 Instead, the indefiniteness of the leave request itself makes
the request for leave unreasonable.149 Like the courts adopting a “cut off” for leave
usage, these courts profess that an accommodation must enable the employee to
perform either presently or in the “immediate future,” because any additional
requirement would place employers in an “untenable business position.”150
Uncertainty as to a date of return typically obviates the need for an employer to
show undue hardship. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has explained that
“employers are not qualified to predict the degree of success of an employee’s
144
See Oestringer v. Dillard Store Servs., Inc., 92 F. App’x 339, 348 (7th Cir. 2004)
(finding that employee who had only taken several short absences of 1-2 weeks each and one
6 week period was not entitled to any additional leave because she did not request specific
period of additional leave).
145
EQUAL EMP’T OPP. COMM’N, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: APPLYING
PERFORMANCE AND CONDUCT STANDARDS TO EMPLOYEES WITH DISABILITIES (Oct. 14, 2008),
http:www.eeoc.gov/facts/performance-conduct.html.
146
EQUAL EMP’T OPP. COMM’N, SMALL EMPLOYERS AND REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
(Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/accommodation.html.
147

Id.

148

Befort, supra note 6, at 463.

149

See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, The Interaction of the ADA, the FMLA and Workers’
Compensation: Why Can’t We Be Friends?, 41 BRANDEIS L. J. 821, 839 (2003); John E.
Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, What Is Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA?
Not an Easy Answer; Rather a Plethora of Questions, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 67, 88 (2009).
150
See Rascon v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 143 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that
prognosis of employee with PTSD was good so leave of 4 months to complete treatment was
reasonable accommodation); Fogleman v. Greater Hazleton Health Alliance, 122 F. App’x
581, 585-86 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no evidence that leave would enable her to perform duties
within reasonable time where no duration given by plaintiff).
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recovery from an illness or injury.”151 Providing an employee with ADA protection
during her indefinite period of recovery would burden the employer with “the duty to
see into the future,” which the court did not see as “the intent of Congress in passing
the ADA.”152 As a court explained in a claim arising under the Rehabilitation Act, if
the date of return is not certain, “an employee could conceivably forestall dismissal
indefinitely.”153 If the request for leave is considered to be indefinite, courts often do
not go farther to consider the circumstances surrounding the request that would
affect the burden imposed on the employer. Instead, courts confronted with a request
for an indefinite amount of leave routinely deny the reasonableness of such an
accommodation.154
An indefinite amount of leave may be deemed unreasonable because an employer
should not be required to assign the work of the person with a disability to someone
else for an indefinite period of time, rather than filling the position on a permanent
basis.155 In rejecting the reasonableness of an indefinite amount of leave, one
appellate court noted that other employees performed the plaintiff’s work during his
absences but did not explain why unlimited leave was too burdensome for this
employer, even for an employee who had received favorable yearly evaluations
despite his previous absences.156
Appellate courts have consistently put the onus on the employee with a disability
to provide a specific date of return before an employer is required to provide any
amount of leave as an accommodation.157 In a 1995 decision often cited for the
proposition that leave of an indefinite duration is an unreasonable accommodation,
the Fourth Circuit refused to require that an employer provide leave for an employee
who sought time off to control his blood sugar and hypertension.158
151

Browning v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 1999).

152

Id. at 1049; see also Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir.
2009) (finding employee able to work after 6 months treatment for cancer); Crano v. Graphic
Packaging Corp., 65 F. App’x 705, 708 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that one sentence stating that
maintaining an employee on indefinite leave is not a reasonable accommodation).
153

Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990).

154

Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting 9 months
of leave taken over 14 month period).
155
Wood v. Green, 323 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that accommodation
must allow employee to perform job duties in present or immediate future); see also Roddy v.
City of Villa Rica, 536 F. App'x 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding no certain date for police
officer’s return to work without restrictions).
156

Wood, 323 F.3d at 1311.

157

See, e.g., Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1999)
(plaintiff did not indicate intention to return to work at any time in the future without
restructuring of his position); Reed, 218 F.3d at 481 (finding employer not required to retain
pilot after using all paid and 9 months additional leave); Hudson v. MCI Telecomms. Corp.,
87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of
expected duration of her impairment as of the date of her termination); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire
Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that plaintiff could not represent that he
likely would have been able to work within a month or two).
158

Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283-84 (4th Cir. 1995).
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To its credit, the Fourth Circuit did go on to explain why unlimited leave would
be unreasonable for that particular employer.159 The employee was a driver for the
county’s transit system, and the court explained that “every business day, there are
routes to be serviced and passengers to be transported,” so it would be unreasonable
for the county to keep his position vacant.160 Requiring the employer to hire
temporary help was found to be an unreasonable requirement, only noting that the
treatment was not certain of success.161 In addition, the court noted that “requiring
paid leave in excess of an employee’s scheduled amount would unjustifiably upset
the employer’s settled budgetary expectations.”162
Other appellate courts have followed the Fourth Circuit’s lead in rejecting the
reasonableness of an indefinite amount of leave.163 The Seventh Circuit gave some
consideration to the employee’s particular duties in determining the reasonableness
of a request for an indefinite amount of leave, even while noting that “the absence of
employees is disruptive to any work environment.”164
In many cases, the Fourth Circuit’s logic regarding indefinite leave requests has
been adopted without requiring a showing of undue hardship on a particular
employer.165 These courts have looked for a definite medical opinion indicating
when the employee will be able to return to work to justify the leave as an
accommodation. Without such an opinion, the leave request is deemed

159

Id. at 283-84.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 283.

163

See Pickens v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 264 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing jury
verdict for plaintiff where he sought leave until he was able to return to work); Mack v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 99-2315, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1012, at *14 (7th Cir. Jan. 21,
2000) (finding that plaintiff’s physician could not predict when he would be able to return to
work); Corder v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that 18
months of leave required by employer showed lack of ability to work in future).
164

Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 950-51 (7th Cir.
2001).
165
See Lara v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 121 F. App’x 796, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2005)
(noting lack of reliable information in hand regarding date of return despite testimony that
plaintiff needed 3-6 weeks of leave); Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1129 (10th Cir.
2000) (leave request unreasonable without expected duration of impairment, where employee
thought she could return in 4 months but doctor stated that duration of illnesses were
unknown); Taylor v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff gave no
indication of when he could return after 1 year of leave); Vice v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Okla., 113 F. App’x 854, 856 (10th Cir. 2004) (employee failed to notify employer of when
she could return during 9 months of leave); Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 727
(6th Cir. 2000) (reasserting requirement for individualized analysis but not requiring
accommodation because even after one year’s paid leave, followed by five months unpaid
leave, plaintiff’s homeopathic physician only offered the vague possibility of returning in one
to three more years, and suggested no other work he could do).
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unreasonable.166 These employees are not given an opportunity to show that their
absence would not impose an undue hardship on their particular employer.167
The Tenth Circuit exemplified this approach in its dismissal of a claim on behalf
of an employee who was diagnosed with cancer and had taken just fifteen days of
leave, after having taken approved intermittent leave prior to that time.168 The
employee was not expected to be able to return to work for at least another twenty
days, and his diagnosis remained unchanged.169 The court explained that whenever
an employee is “uncertain if or when he will be able to return to work,” a leave of
absence is unreasonable.170 It is noteworthy that this court based this finding of
“uncertainty” regarding the plaintiff’s ability to return to work on just two months of
leave, one of which occurred two years earlier, and its concern that the plaintiff
could not prove that the impairment itself, the cancer, could not be “resolved” at the
end of the requested leave.171
Generally, the lack of qualification for a position resulting from a person’s
disability must be based on a reliable medical opinion. For example, an employee
suffering from paranoia raised issues of fact regarding her ability to perform
essential job duties based on the supportive opinions of two physicians.172 A court
reviewing a claim that the employee is not otherwise qualified to perform the
essential duties of his or her position may challenge the reliability of a medical
opinion that qualification is lacking, but that challenge may raise issues of fact that
will defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment. Requests for leave as an
accommodation are typically based on an employee’s medical condition. Such
medical conditions inherently often carry some amount of uncertainty as to the time
necessary for treatment and/or recovery. Most courts put the burden of that
uncertainty on the employee seeking leave as an accommodation.173

166

Id.

167

Id.

168

Valdez v. McGill, 462 F. App’x 814, No. 11-2051, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2783, at *24, *9-10 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 2012).
169

Id. at *3.

170

Id. at *9.

171

Id.

172

Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dept. of Health Servs., 172 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir.
1999); see also Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv. Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) (no
direct threat shown where doctor failed to conduct testing of applicant's strength or lifting
mechanics before finding that she failed pre-employment examination); Quinney v. Swire
Coca-Cola, USA, No. 2:07-cv-788-PMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42098, at *3-4 (D. Utah
May 18, 2009) (lack of qualification shown by Medical Review Officer opinion that employee
should not operate company a vehicle while taking narcotic pain medication).
173
See, e.g., Valdez v. McGill, 462 F. App’x 814, 818-19 (10th Cir. 2012) (summary
judgment for employer even though employee submitted two doctors’ notes regarding
expected date of return, discharged just 1 day after FMLA expired and 3 weeks before second
expected date of return); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1997) (opinion
that employee had good chance of returning after leave was insufficient); Cisneros v. Wilson,
226 F.3d 1113, 1126 (10th Cir. 2000) (letter from physician stated it was “uncertain” when
she might be able to return to work and second physician’s letter stated that duration of her
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Under this approach, employees who need an undetermined amount of additional
leave face a heavy, if not impossible, burden of production. For example, the Second
Circuit expected a seventeen-year employee to produce factual information
regarding his medical condition that did not exist, and consequently approved his
discharge, based on the expiration of six months of disability leave.174 That court had
originally remanded the claim because the employee alleged that he only needed two
additional weeks of leave to obtain a doctor’s release to return to work.175 Yet the
claim was ultimately dismissed on summary judgment because the employee failed
to show that “the accommodation would likely result in his return to work” and
because any further absences would have caused the employer a “business
hardship.”176 Citing the Fourth Circuit, the court opined that “the employee must
make a showing that the reasonable accommodation would allow him to do so at or
around the time at which it is sought.”177
This employee could not establish even a factual question regarding whether two
additional weeks of leave would be a reasonable accommodation.178 To survive a
motion for summary judgment, the court expected that at the time of the request for
leave, the employee should have provided his employer with “assurance” that the
accommodation would allow him to perform.179 The court made the factual
determination to rely on a doctor’s report sent to the employer on the day his leave
was denied, which stated that it was unlikely that he would be able to return to his
previous job, and stated that it could take two to three months of recovery before he
could return to any employment.180 The employee could not avoid summary
judgment despite a report issued six days later by the same doctor, who stated that he
“would not be able to return to his job ‘in the foreseeable future’” and stating that he
was “totally incapable of performing his job.”181 Summary judgment was granted
despite the court’s conclusion that a reasonable jury could find that this second
report “did not accurately state whether [the employee] was ‘qualified’ to ‘perform
the essential functions’ of his job with a reasonable accommodation,” because it was
prepared in support of his claim for disability benefits.182 This set of decisions
illustrates the lengths to which some courts will go to grant summary judgment in
favor of an employer seeking to avoid leave as an accommodation. At least some
courts demand this very specific level of proof in response to a motion for summary
judgment to preserve the employee’s claim for a reasonable accommodation.
illnesses were “unknown,” even though plaintiff gave expected date of return just 2 months
after employer refused to extend leave).
174

Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 353 F. App’x 558 (2d Cir. 2009).

175

Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2006).

176

Graves, 353 F. App’x at 560.

177

Id.

178

Id. at 560-61.

179

Id. at 561.

180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Id.
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In stark contrast to the heavy burden placed on a plaintiff seeking leave as an
accommodation by these above-referenced courts, other appellate courts have been
reluctant to require that an employee provide a specific, firm date for his or her
return to work.183 These appellate courts have been leery of a per se rule that any
leave of an indefinite duration is unreasonable.184 Under this approach, the court
considers the reasonableness of an employee’s request for leave as “a factual
determination untethered to the defendant employer’s particularized situation.”185
These courts stress that an individualized assessment must be used to determine
if the leave would constitute a reasonable accommodation.186 One of these courts
recognized that even though “[s]ome employees, by the nature of their disability, are
unable to provide an absolutely assured time for their return to employment,” each
case must be reviewed individually rather than requiring a definite date of return in
each situation.187 In this claim, the plaintiff had requested a specific two-month
period of leave as an accommodation, and the employer failed to show that the
additional leave would impose an undue hardship.188 Yet even under a more
individualized approach, the indefiniteness of the employee’s expected date of return
to work may show the unreasonableness of a request for additional leave,
particularly if the treating physician cannot give a time frame regarding a return to
work.189
Like the approach of these courts, but in contrast to the EEOC’s guidance
described above, the EEOC’s technical assistance states that leave may be a
reasonable accommodation even if he or she cannot provide a fixed date of return.190
At the same time, the EEOC advises that the lack of a fixed return to work date may
constitute an undue hardship if the employer cannot plan for the employee’s return
or permanently fill the position.191 The EEOC makes a distinction between an
indefinite amount of leave, which is unreasonable if it involves situations in which
an employee can give no indication of if or when he or she will be able to return to
work, and situations where the employee is able to give an approximate date of
183
See Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006); Humphrey v. Mem’l
Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (ADA does not require employee to show
that leave of absence is certain or even likely to be successful to prove that it is a reasonable
accommodation).
184

Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782 (6th Cir. 1998);
Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136; Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647
(1st Cir. 2000); Dark, 451 F.3d at 1090 (89 days of sick leave could be reasonable
accommodation to give employee time to adjust to new medication to control seizures).
185

Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 726 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000).

186

Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 647.

187

Id. at 648; see also Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600-01 (7th
Cir. 1998) (leave of additional 2-4 weeks, based on her physician’s opinion that the symptoms
would be “short lived,” could be reasonable).
188

Id. at 648-49.

189

Walsh, 201 F.3d at 726-27.

190

EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4.

191

Id.
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return or a range of possible return dates.192 The EEOC does not suggest that an
employer must grant leave as an accommodation where an employee can give no
indication of whether he or she will ever be able to return to work.193
The EEOC’s Guidance on Performance and Misconduct responds to the question
“Do employers have to grant indefinite leave as a reasonable accommodation to
employees with disabilities?” with the answer “No . . . they have no obligation to
provide leave of indefinite duration.”194 This guidance provides inconsistent
information to both employers and employees seeking leave.195 This inconsistency
may underlie employers’ criticism of the EEOC’s guidance as providing “very little
assistance in determining when a request for leave stops being definite and
reasonable and becomes indefinite and unreasonable.”196
The per se rule adopted by many appellate courts regarding leave of an indefinite
duration places a heavy burden on the employee with a disability and his or her
health care providers to determine with some certainty not only the length of leave
that is needed, but also the expected duration of the impairment which is causing the
need for leave. This burden may result in a loss of employment for people with
disabilities, since no one can predict with “total certainty” the time required for
future medical treatment and recovery.197 In other appellate courts, professional
evidence that some additional leave is necessary may be sufficient to demonstrate
the reasonableness of that leave request, even if neither the employee nor the health
care provider can predict with certainty when the employee will be able to return.198
This deference to employers who discharge employees who need an indefinite
amount of leave gives employers a strong incentive to discharge earlier rather than
later. As exemplified by the decisions described above,199 an employee is unlikely to
know a definite date of return shortly after diagnosis or even during treatment. Thus,
an employer can discharge an employee with a disability at that early stage without
fear of liability for any failure to accommodate.
D. Consideration of Leave Policies
An employer’s leave policies have been considered and sometimes afforded
controlling weight in determining whether a leave request is reasonable.200 In many
circumstances where the leave requested exceeds the amount provided by an
192

Id.

193

Kuczynski, supra note 44; East, supra note 14.

194

EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4.

195

East, supra note 14.

196

McLaughlin, supra note 10.

197

Center, supra note 68.

198

See, e.g., Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648 (1st Cir. 2000);
Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 600-01 (leave of additional 2-4 weeks,
based on her physician’s opinion that the symptoms would be “short lived,” could be
reasonable).
199

Peyton v. Fred’s Stores of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2009); Hudson v. MCI
Telecomm. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996).
200

Befort, supra note 6, at 461-62.
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employer’s policy or even just past practice, the employer is not required to show
that additional leave would impose an undue hardship.201 Instead, the policy itself is
enough to establish that the leave requested is unreasonable. At the same time,
experts have contended that an employer’s policies or practices are not a complete
defense to the requirement to provide reasonable accommodation.202 In other words,
even “neutral rules are not sacrosanct.”203 The role of employer policies in
determining what accommodations are reasonable was addressed by the Supreme
Court with respect to seniority policies, but the Court’s reasoning may not translate
well to determine the reasonableness of requests for leave.
1. Supreme Court Consideration of Employer Policies
The Supreme Court considered the significance of employer seniority policies in
determining whether a transfer to another position would be a reasonable
accommodation, in one of only a few decisions concerning the reasonableness of
accommodations.204 Under this 2002 decision, an employer’s leave policy is relevant
but not conclusive as to whether a transfer would be a reasonable accommodation,
even where another employee may seek that same position under an employer’s
seniority policy.205 For the reasons outlined below, an employer’s policy regarding
leave should not be given the same weight as a seniority policy in determining
whether the amount of leave is reasonable.
The Supreme Court reviewed the claim of an employee who sought a transfer to
a position to which another employee was entitled under the employer’s seniority
policy and concluded that an employer’s seniority system was entitled to a
presumption of deference to support a conclusion that the transfer was an
unreasonable accommodation.206 At the same time, the Court also recognized that
accommodation sometimes requires differential treatment207 and therefore refused to
find that an employer’s neutral policy created an automatic exemption from any
requirement to provide reasonable accommodation.208 Such an automatic exemption
would not allow the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision to accomplish its
intended objective.209
The Court reasoned that an employer’s seniority policy may justify the denial of
an accommodation based on “the importance of seniority to employee-management
relations.”210 Seniority systems have been given special consideration under all non201

See infra notes 228-58 and accompanying text.

202

Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV.
1119, 1152 (2010).
203

Id.

204

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404 (2002).

205

Id.

206

Id. at 397.

207

Weber, supra note 202, at 1161.

208

Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398.

209

Id. at 397.

210

Id. at 403.
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discrimination statutes because the typical seniority system creates and fulfills
employee expectations of fair, uniform treatment.211 To require an employer to prove
undue hardship, rather than just the existence of a seniority system, could undermine
those expectations as well as a seniority system as a whole.212
This respect for seniority systems should not give employers’ leave policies the
same influence in determining whether leave is a reasonable accommodation.
Overall, a broad application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning to other employer
policies could lead to the discharge of productive employees with disabilities.213 In
fact, the Court’s reasoning regarding seniority systems has been criticized since it
does not consider the costs of failing to provide an accommodation, including the
departure costs associated with losing the employee with a disability who cannot
remain employed without the accommodation.214
In addition, nondiscrimination statutes and decisions interpreting the ADA have
not recognized an employer’s right to determine an appropriate amount of leave, in
contrast to their specific deference to seniority policies.215 Moreover, unlike
seniority, leave policies are not closely tied to employment relations or employment
decisions such as reassignment or promotion, and do not represent a system of
“delayed benefits” as does a seniority system.
More specifically, the Court’s deference to seniority policies should not be
directly applied to accommodation requests for leave that exceed the amount of
leave provided under an employer’s policies because the interests created or
protected by a seniority policy are much more distinct than any coworkers’ interests
affected by extension of leave as an accommodation beyond what is required under
an employer’s policy. In respecting an employer’s seniority policy, the Court
specifically aimed to protect the particular coworker interests in enforcement of a
seniority policy, based on the expectations created by such a policy.216 Since leave
would not trample on such clearly defined interests of other employees, the
deference to seniority policies shown by the Supreme Court should not necessarily
be extended to other employer policies.217

211

Id. at 404. At least one expert has suggested that an employer should be required to
present evidence of loss, such as damage to co-workers’ expectations under a seniority
system, since the employer alone has this information. Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at
171.
212

Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404-05.

213

Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the Conflict Between Disabled
Employees and their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 313, 324 (2007); see also Anderson,
Neutral Policies, supra note 40, at 35-36.
214

Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 183-84. These costs include the disabled
employee’s loss of his investments in skills and knowledge specific to that employer and the
remaining dividends from his sunk investments/delayed dividends contract, while facing the
prospect of lower wages and uncertain employment prospects in the external labor market. Id.
at 189.
215

Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403.

216

Id. at 403-05.

217

Weber, supra note 202, at 1164.
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Even though it could be argued that other employees may be required to perform
extra work if a coworker’s leave is extended, that interest is much less distinct than a
coworker who expects to benefit from his or her seniority. Rather, leave as an
accommodation may not greatly interfere with the interests of other employees.218
When one employee takes leave, a coworker may experience at most minimal
adverse consequences, particularly where work can be distributed among several
employees, compared to the harm to a coworker losing out on a transfer to which he
or she is entitled based on seniority. In addition, any effects on coworkers caused by
leave taken by an employee with a disability can be minimized by the employer
much easier than the effects of ignoring rights existing under a seniority system.219
Seniority policies are also worthy of greater deference than employer leave
policies because a seniority system is typically well publicized and understood by all
affected employees.220 In contrast, an employer’s leave may be granted on an ad hoc
basis. In fact, any policies can and should be read so as to imply an exception for
accommodations. Leave policies can be seen as providing a floor above which an
employer has promised to stay, rather than a ceiling on benefits to be provided to
employees. Leave policies generally apply to all employees, not just those with
disabilities, including those who may be using leave for a variety of reasons that
provide no benefit to the employer. Since the ADA does require that employers
provide different accommodations based on employees’ disabilities, it may not be
unreasonable to expect employers to vary from leave policies, particularly if the
employer cannot show that such a variation would impose an undue hardship.
Lastly, leave policies are not worthy of as much deference as seniority systems
because of the strong connection between use of leave and an employee’s disability.
An exception to an employer’s leave policy is often sought because of limitations
imposed by the person’s disability.221 Therefore, a blanket policy of discharging
employees after a certain period of leave screens out or tends to screen out
individuals with disabilities at a disproportionate rate compared to other employees.
Since uniformly applied leave policies are not subject to challenge under disparate
impact theory,222 it is particularly important for employees to be able to request a
variation from such a leave policy as an accommodation.
The impact of employer’s leave policies on reasonable accommodation
determinations should also be limited by the Supreme Court’s reluctance to give
absolute deference to an employer’s seniority policy. Under its decision, an
employee can still show that a transfer is a reasonable accommodation even though it
conflicts with an employer’s seniority system, if “special circumstances” alter the
expectations of other employees under that seniority system.223 These circumstances
include an employer’s past exceptions to that policy, or different application of that
218

Porter, supra note 213, at 355.

219

Id. at 359.

220

Harris, Re-Thinking, supra note 33, at 148.

221
Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 954 (2004) (discussing the “sameness”
model of equality).
222

29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.15(b) and (c).

223

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002).
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policy to other employees.224 Under these circumstances, the employee with a
disability could show that such a policy should not be used to establish the
unreasonableness or even the undue hardship caused by his or her use of leave.225
This consideration of “special circumstances” demonstrates that if a policy is not
enforced consistently, then it may not be sufficient basis for denying a particular
accommodation. Therefore, the emphasis in reviewing requests for leave that goes
beyond an employer’s policies should focus on whether that employer has made
exceptions for other employees without disabilities.226 Courts should also consider
whether a greater burden is being placed on employees with disabilities who are
seeking leave compared to other employees whose requests for leave are granted
without the concrete medical evidence that is often required to justify leave as an
accommodation.227
For these reasons, appellate courts should not give unlimited deference to
employers who rely on their own policies in denying leave as an accommodation.
Instead, both the past application of that policy and the individual circumstances
surrounding the request for leave should be considered under the Supreme Court’s
guidance.
2. Courts’ Deference to Leave Policies
Appellate courts have taken two distinct approaches when considering the
reasonableness of leave that exceeds an employer’s policies. In line with an equal
treatment approach, several appellate courts have consistently given deference to an
employer’s policies as the upper limit on how much leave is reasonable.228 This
deference gives considerable flexibility to employers who have developed policies
for all employees, without requiring that those employers justify those policies by
establishing undue hardship in the face of a claim for reasonable accommodation. A
second, smaller group of appellate courts do not give complete deference to an
employer’s leave policies in determining the reasonableness and undue hardship
caused by a leave request; instead, those courts focused on whether a variance from
that policy would negatively affect the employer.229

224

Id.

225

Id.

226

Petesch, supra note 11.

227

See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (discussion of evidence required to
justify leave requests).
228
See Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 950-51 (7th Cir.
2001) (allowing employer to rely heavily on its five-step progressive discipline procedure
regarding employee absences to justify denial of leave); Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co.,
266 F. App’x 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007) (discharge for absence of 16 days upheld under policy
that “The availability to work the normal workday is a condition of employment and good
attendance is a job requirement that all . . . Employees are expected to meet.”); Greer v.
Emerson Electric Co., 185 F.3d 917, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding employee discharge
based on employer’s policy and progressive discipline practice regarding absenteeism); Crano
v. Graphic Packaging Corp., 65 F. App’x 705 (10th Cir. 2003) (discharge after 1 year
approved under employer’s policy).
229

See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
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In many decisions, a leave request has been deemed unreasonable because it
exceeds the amount of leave allowed under the employer’s policies.230 Such
deference to an employer’s policies allows employers to define the amount of leave
that is reasonable as an accommodation. In addition, many of these courts have not
considered how the leave policy has been applied or interpreted in the past, 231
despite the importance of these factors recognized by the Supreme Court.232 Such
blind deference to employer’s policies undermines an employee’s ability to show
that he or she is being treated less preferentially than other employees, even those
without disabilities.
This deference to employer’s policies foregoes courts’ statutory obligation under
the ADA to consider whether leave as an accommodation in a particular situation
would place an undue hardship on the employer. Consequently, courts and
employers are not considering the relative costs associated with keeping the position
open for an employee with a disability who may be difficult to replace because of his
or her tenure with that employer and the skills and abilities held by that employee.
In these policy-deferential courts, employees have not been successful in using
leave policies or past practices to establish the reasonableness of their requests for
leave that is allowed under those policies.233 The Fourth Circuit explained that leave
is not necessarily reasonable even if it is required by an employer’s policy, which
“are not the definitive source of the standard by which reasonable accommodation is
measured under federal law.”234 These courts have not addressed the significant
policy considerations which were relied upon by the Supreme Court in giving
considerable deference to an employer’s seniority policy which do not apply to a
leave policy, as discussed above.235
If an employer does not have a set policy in place, a past practice of allowing
unpaid absences does not necessarily establish that future leave is a reasonable
accommodation. 236 The Third Circuit held, for example, that an obese employee
failed to show that an additional four days of unpaid leave would be a reasonable
accommodation, even though the employer had granted past leave to her in excess of
its eighteen days of paid sick leave per year.237 Any additional leave would have
created an undue burden for this employer where it had already granted her extensive
unpaid leave in the past.238 The court was not influenced by the employer’s policy of
230

See infra cases at note 241.

231
See, e.g., Colón-Fontánez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17, 43-44 (1st Cir.
2011) (absences in excess of 90 days provided for sick leave deemed unreasonable regardless
of past application of policy).
232

U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002).

233

Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Buckles v. First Data Res.,
Inc., 176 F.3d 1098, 1100-01 (8th Cir. 1999) (use of all leave allowed by policy at start of year
made additional leave unreasonable); Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir.
1999) (request to use leave whenever needed was unreasonable).
234

Id.

235

See supra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.

236

See supra notes 214-27 and accompanying text.

237

Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n, 168 F.3d 661, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1999).

238

Id. at 671.
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allowing up to six months on leave without pay.239 Note that the court used the
“undue burden” language, but the only burden shown by this employer was the
amount of leave previously taken by this employee.240
These decisions show that employers can often take advantage of an established
leave policy to establish that leave that exceeds that policy allotment would be
unreasonable. At the same time, an employee who seeks leave allowed by an
employer’s policy may not be able to show that the leave is required as an
accommodation, if the court finds that the amount of leave already used or the timing
of the leave would be unreasonable for the employer to tolerate.
In contrast to these policy—deferential courts, the EEOC and some appellate
courts are more reluctant to use an employer’s leave policy as the benchmark for
reasonableness. Some courts have refused to find that leave is an unreasonable
accommodation even if it would not be required under an employer’s policy.241 In
these courts, employers are required to show that leave beyond the requirements of
their policies would impose an undue hardship.242
Under such a fact-specific, individualized approach, some courts “weigh the risks
and alternatives, including possible hardships on the employer, to determine whether
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the reasonableness of the
accommodation.”243 The First Circuit, for example, has held that an employer cannot
justify a discharge solely because the employee had used all leave available under
the employer’s policy.244 That employer had a policy of reserving a job for one year
when employees had been out on short-term disability and had discharged the
plaintiff after her one-year reservation period ended.245 The court made it clear that
the ADA can require an employer to grant an accommodation beyond the leave
allowed under the company’s own leave policy.246
The limited deference to leave policies shown by these courts is consistent with
the legislative history of the ADA, which demonstrates that variation from a neutral
employer rule or policy could be required as an accommodation.247 Similarly, the
239
Id.; see also Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1997) (2
additional months of leave after 10 months off was unreasonable despite employer’s 12 month
Salary Continuation Program).
240

Id. at 670-71.

241

See, e.g., Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (leave of
up to 1 year was reasonable accommodation where employer policy allowed for 1 year of
unpaid medical leave and employer regularly used temporary help); Rascon v. U.S. W.
Commc’n, 143 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1998) (request for 4 additional months of leave
could be reasonable under policy allowing 6 months of disability leave and additional personal
leave); Ralph v. Lucent Tech., 135 F.3d 166, 172 (1st Cir. 1998) (employer may be required
to grant leave beyond the 52 weeks provided by the employer’s policy).
242

Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648-49 (1st Cir. 2000).

243

Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1247.

244

Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 646.

245

Id.

246

Id.

247

H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 62-63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
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EEOC takes the position that if an employee needs leave which exceeds the amount
of leave allowed under an employer’s “no fault” leave policy, “the employer must
modify its ‘no fault’ leave policy to provide the employee with additional leave,”
unless the employer can show that another effective accommodation would enable
the performance of the essential functions of the employee’s position, or additional
leave would impose an undue hardship.248
Under this guidance, the EEOC recently has settled class action claims against an
increasing number of large employers, including both Sears Roebuck ($6.2 million)
and Supervalu supermarkets ($3.2 million), based on claims that those employers
automatically discharged employees who were unable to return to work when their
leave “expired” under the employers’ policies.249 The EEOC explained that both
employers failed to engage in an individualized analysis or the interactive process
required by the ADA.250 The EEOC has taken the position that “(1) an inflexible
leave period, even if it provides a substantial amount of leave, is not sufficient; and
(2) individualized analysis on leave accommodations is needed, even with a
generous policy.”251 These guidelines have been criticized as failing to define the
scope of the requirement to modify an employer’s leave policy.252 Given such
potential liability and the lack of clarity in the EEOC’s guidance, employer
representatives have called for more detailed and defined examples of situations
where maximum leave policies are called into question and provide examples of
times when additional leave will be deemed necessary and when it will not.253
Some courts are more willing to find that leave which exceeds an employer’s
policy is reasonable if past practice has allowed or condoned such leave in the past.
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to defer to policies
that have not been applied consistently.254 Thus, an employer’s past practice of
tolerating absences can establish the reasonableness of tolerating such attendance as
an accommodation in certain courts. For example, the Third Circuit has twice
considered an employer’s own application of its leave policy.255 In one case, the
court refused to conclude that the employee’s attendance had “significantly impacted
her performance” given the employer’s own positive reviews of her performance and
the five year tolerance of her absences.256 In a second claim, the court focused on the
consistency of the employer’s application of its attendance policies with respect to
248

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2011); EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4.

249

Sears, 26 Daily Labor Report A-12 (BNA) (Feb. 10, 2010); Supervalu, 3 Daily Labor
Report AA-1(BNA) (Jan. 5, 2011).
250

McGowan, supra note 97.

251

John Hendrickson, Statement at EEOC Meeting to Examine Use of Leave as
Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC (Jun. 8, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/6-811/hendrickson.cfm; see also Petesch, supra note 11.
252

McLaughlin, supra note 10.

253

Id.

254

See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s reasoning on past practice).

255

Flory v. Pinnacle Health Hosps., 346 F. App’x. 872, 874, 876 (3d Cir. 2009); Miller v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 350 F. App’x. 727, 728 (3d Cir. 2009).
256

Flory, 346 F. App’x. at 876.
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non-disabled employees, and the employer’s adherence to its progressive discipline
policy.257 At the same time, consistent application of an employer’s policy helps
establish that leave in excess of that policy would be unreasonable or impose an
undue hardship.258
These courts are willing to consider the reasonableness of leave as an
accommodation separate from the employer’s interpretation of what leave would be
reasonable for all of its employees. Yet most of the appellate courts, as outlined
above, give deference to an employer’s leave policies as evidence of what leave
would be reasonable, especially if that policy has been applied consistently to
employees without disabilities. This deference gives considerable discretion to
employers to set leave policies that fit with their overall needs without much fear
that the ADA will be interpreted to require additional leave.
E. Legal Requirements and Reasonableness
Employers that meet their legal requirements for granting leave may be able to
establish the reasonableness of denying any additional leave as an accommodation.
Generally, an employee who takes leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) is only entitled to restoration in the same or an equivalent position if by end
of the FMLA leave period, the employee is able to perform the essential functions of
the job.259 Yet an employee who has exhausted his or her FMLA leave may still be
able to show that he or she is entitled to accommodations under the ADA, including
additional leave.260
Despite this distinct duty to accommodate, many employers discharge employees
who have exhausted their FMLA leave without providing any additional leave as an
accommodation under the ADA.261 In many circuits, these employers have not been
required to accommodate by extending additional leave beyond the leave required by
the FMLA as an accommodation.262 For some appellate courts, the provision of
257

Miller, 350 F. App’x at 729; see also Carmona v. Sw. Airlines Co., 604 F.3d 848, 85152, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2010) (attendants have unlimited discretion in determining when and how
often they want to work); Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1998) (more than
5 weeks leave reasonable where all employees allowed 52 week of paid disability leave).
258

See Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (9th Cir.
2012) (seven unplanned absences by nurse exceeded policy allowing five); Brenneman v.
MedCentral Health Sys., 366 F.3d 412, 416, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2004) (employer’s attendance
point system was uniformly applied to each employee and the employer had discharged other
non-disabled employees under that system).
259

29 C.F.R. § 825.214 (2014).

260
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 4, at Q&A 21; EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT, THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, AND TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2009), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/fmlaada.html; see also Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204
F.3d 326, 335 (2d Cir. 2000) (summary judgment denied where employee sought to return
part time after FMLA leave ended).
261
Center, supra note 68; see, e.g., Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, 218 F.3d 477, 478, 480
(5th Cir. 2000) (helicopter pilot unable to return to work at end of leave); Orta-Castro v.
Merck Sharpe & Dohme Quimica P.R. Inc., 447 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 2006).
262
See, e.g., Orta-Castro, 447 F.3d at 112 (employee granted leave required by Puerto
Rican law).
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leave under federal or state standards is enough to satisfy the duty to accommodate.
263
The Fifth Circuit, for example, dismissed a claim of an employee because she
could not show that she could perform the essential duties of her position either
while she was on FMLA leave or on the day she was discharged, which was the final
day of that leave.264 Similarly, in denying a claim for leave beyond FMLA
requirements, the Seventh Circuit explained that coverage of absences by the FMLA
was “irrelevant” in determining whether the leave was a reasonable accommodation,
because the ADA only applies to someone who can perform the job.265 This
approach directly nullifies the right to leave as an accommodation as well as an
employee’s rights under the FMLA.266
This deference to an employer’s compliance with the FMLA or other leave
requirements ignores the substantial policy reasons for providing reasonable
accommodation under the ADA in addition to the FMLA’s leave requirements. The
FMLA itself recognizes that “[n]othing in this Act or any amendment made by this
Act shall be construed to discourage employers from adopting or retaining leave
policies more generous than any policies that comply with the requirements under
this Act.”267
There are several reasons why the FMLA should not be seen as the upper limit
on leave provided as an accommodation. First, FMLA leave is available to any
employees who meet the service requirements and can show a qualifying event,
regardless of whether or not they are a person with a disability.268 Therefore, the
concerns about discrimination and job retention that support the reasonable
accommodation requirement do not necessarily apply to employees asserting FMLA
rights.269

263

Id.

264

Reed, 218 F.3d at 481.

265

Perkins v. Ameritech Corp., 161 Fed. Appx. 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Byrne v.
Avon Prods. Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380 (7th Cir. 2003) (leave for several months not reasonable
accommodation despite eligibility for FMLA leave); Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of
Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2002) (ADA claim based on request for leave
dismissed despite right to FMLA leave); Trevino v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., No. 3:08-CV0889, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98738, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2009) (request for FMLA
leave cannot establish failure to accommodate).
266

See Watkins v. J&S Oil Co. Inc., 164 F.3d 55, 62 (1st Cir. 1998) (employer was not
required by ADA to hold position open until end of the FMLA leave).
267

29 U.S.C.A. § 2653 (West 2014).

268

The purposes of FMLA include the following:

(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to promote the
stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in
preserving family integrity; [and] (2) to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for
medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child, spouse
or parent who has a serious health condition; . . . .
Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(b)(1), (2) (West 2014).
269

See Navaro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 101 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The ADA and the FMLA
have divergent aims, operate in different ways, and offer disparate relief.”).
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Second, the FMLA requires no more than twelve weeks of leave based on an
employee’s own health condition.270 Twelve weeks may be insufficient time to
enable an employee with a disability to receive treatment or recover from a
significant injury or illness, such as cancer. Yet after a relatively short and possibly
even certain time beyond the twelve weeks, that employee could return to his or her
previous position without causing the employer undue hardship.
Third, the FMLA does not require accommodations.271 Therefore, if an employer
can discharge an employee at the end of his or her FMLA leave, without considering
extension of that leave as an accommodation, then the employee foregoes the
opportunity to seek other accommodations at the end of his or her accommodation
leave which could enable the return to work. For example, with an additional two
weeks of leave beyond her FMLA leave, an employee may be able to return to work
if she is also provided with periodic breaks or a flexible schedule.
Courts have failed to recognize that leave as an accommodation may exceed the
amount of leave available under the FMLA. Instead, many courts conflate the two
obligations, while only a few make a separate determination regarding the
reasonableness of the leave request.
F. Undue Hardship Caused by Leave
Thus far we have seen the significant evidence that many courts require for a
plaintiff employee to show that leave is a reasonable accommodation. Even if a
request for leave is considered to be a reasonable accommodation, an employer can
still avoid the obligation to accommodation if that accommodation would impose an
undue hardship. When considering whether an accommodation imposes an undue
hardship, the ADA requires that courts consider various factors, including cost, the
effect on an employer’s operations, the overall financial resources and size of the
employer, and the type of operation involved.272 These factors should be assessed on
a case-by-case basis.273
It is noteworthy that these factors provided by the EEOC do not include any
effect of the accommodation on other employees.274 Some have argued that effects
on other employees should be compared to the benefit provided by the
accommodation to the employee with a disability, and this factor should only be
considered if the accommodation would result in the discharge of another
employee.275
270

29 U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West 2014).

271

29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (2014); Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir.
2002).
272

42 U.S.C.A. §12111(10)(B) (West 2014).

273

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-05 (2002); see also Morton v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 272 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other grounds
sub nom. by Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(“Undue hardship analysis is thus a fact-intensive inquiry, rarely suitable for resolution on
summary judgment.”); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999)
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As evidenced by the employer-specific statutory factors, the determination of
whether an accommodation imposes an undue hardship should be based on specific
facts regarding the individual employee making the request as well as the
organization where he or she works.276 This makes the undue hardship determination
particularly appropriate for juries, rather than motions for summary judgment.277
Leaving these factual questions to a jury makes sense since “members of the
community will collectively be much more familiar with the modern workplace than
a judge whose non-legal work experience may have come decades earlier.”278
Many dismissals of claims seeking leave as an accommodation do not reach the
question of undue hardship because the court determines that the accommodation is
unreasonable.279 In only limited circumstances have appellate courts denied
summary judgment for employers in claims for accommodation based on the
absence of tangible costs associated with employees’ use of leave.280 In courts
following this approach, an employer must show that the leave by the particular
employee will have a negative effect on that employer, either as part of the
determination regarding whether the accommodation is reasonable or, more often, as
part of its undue hardship analysis.281
For example, the Sixth Circuit, in reviewing a request for leave by one employee
with lupus, refused to adopt a “bright-line rule defining a maximum duration of
leave that can constitute a reasonable accommodation,” and instead expected the
employer to establish that the leave would impose an undue hardship.282 In line with
the EEOC guidelines, the court considered the type of operation or operations of the
covered entity, including the difficulty that this employer would have in covering the
claimant’s duties with another employee at that location.283 The court concluded that
without evidence regarding the employer’s financial situation, “reasonable jurors
could find by a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a
verdict.”284 The court also discounted the evidence related to undue hardship based
on the disparaging statements made by her supervisor regarding the plaintiff’s
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Weber, supra note 202, at 1151.
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Id.
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Id. at 1175; see also Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 602 (7th
Cir. 1998) (“Consideration of the degree of excessiveness is a factual issue well suited to a
jury determination.”).
279
See supra notes 100-273 and accompanying text (discussing of grounds for finding
leave to be an unreasonable accommodation based on the length or indefiniteness of the leave
or based on employer’s policies or legal obligations).
280
See Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 F. App’x. 74, 78 (6th Cir. 2003); Gantt v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Cleveland, 83 F. App’x. at 78.
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Id. at 80; see also Siekaniec v. Columbia Gas Co., 48 F. App’x. 173, 175 (6th Cir. 2002)
(requiring employer to cover sporadic absences with two on call employees would cause
undue hardship).
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disability,285 concluding that the supervisor’s “business judgment was clouded by his
animosity towards individuals who have lupus.”286 This reasoning highlights why it
is important for courts to look beyond employers’ policies to determine whether a
specific request for leave would impose a hardship on an employer.
Like the Sixth Circuit, the First Circuit has required some employers to show that
the leave requested by an employee with a disability would impose an undue
hardship.287 For example, an IBM employee was able to enforce a jury verdict in her
favor based in part on IBM’s provision of fifty-two weeks of paid disability leave to
all employees.288 This circuit has at least twice recognized that leave did not
financially burden an employer because a permanent replacement was not necessary,
noting that “it was always more profitable to allow an employee time to recover than
to hire and train a new employee.”289 For example, a claim was upheld where one
plaintiff’s temporary replacement was being paid no more than the plaintiff, and
there was no evidence that the temporary replacement was less effective at her job.290
In line with the EEOC Guidelines, the resources of the employer are sometimes
considered in determining whether the leave requested would impose an undue
hardship.291 For example, an employer with fifty to sixty thousand employees
worldwide could not show an undue hardship where the employer did not replace the
plaintiff while he was on leave and other employees covered for him.292 Similarly,
Time Warner was unable to show undue hardship where the plaintiff’s position
remained vacant approximately six months after her discharge and Time Warner’s
policy allowed for leave while the employee was on short or long term disability.293
At the same time, individualized consideration of undue hardship may work in favor
of an employer with limited resources or a need for a particular level of staffing.294
Regardless of which side is favored, consideration of undue hardship analysis is
unusual. Instead, most appellate courts favor the cleaner, seemingly more
285

Id.
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Id.; see also Brenneman v. MedCentral Health, 366 F.3d 412, 416, 418-19 (6th Cir.
2004) (employee’s absences “placed a great strain on the department” by requiring employer
to call in another employee or reassign her duties).
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Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1998).
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Id. at 444.
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Id.; see also Garcia-Ayala v. Lederele Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648 (1st Cir.
2000) (temporary employee used to replace plaintiff and no need to permanently replace her).
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Garcia-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 649.
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Rascon v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir. 1998); Haschmann
v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 151 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1998).
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See Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (six month leave
of absence was unreasonable for a police officer for a small municipality which could not
reallocate that employee's job duties among its small staff); Samper v. Providence St. Vincent
Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment granted for employer
which had difficulty replacing specially trained nurse on irregular basis and understaffing
compromised patient care).
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“objective” approach focusing on the reasonableness of the accommodation. To the
employees’ detriment, this approach does not require that the employer establish any
actual harm caused by the accommodation. If the amount of leave needed is
indefinite or has exceeded the amount available under the employer’s policies at the
time of the employee’s discharge, then any additional leave can be deemed
unreasonable and the employee’s discharge can be deemed nondiscriminatory.
This approach provides two significant incentives for employers of persons with
disabilities. First, employers are encouraged to discharge an employee early in the
course of their recovery or treatment, before the employee has enough medical
information to predict when he or she can return to work. This timing makes the
employee’s need for leave indefinite, and therefore the discharge without providing
additional leave can be justified.
Second, employers are encouraged to provide little or no leave in their policies
and to deny leave as a matter of practice. By doing so, the employer is better
positioned to argue that leave as an accommodation would be unreasonable. This
incentive may cause employers to disregard the factors that might otherwise support
more generous leave policies, such as the recruitment and training costs associated
with replacing valuable employees. Instead, employers may deny leave requests of
valuable employees for fear of creating a “policy” of providing leave.
In addition, as the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit highlights, the failure to require
individualized assessment of the undue hardship caused by leave as an
accommodation allows employers to rely on broad assumptions about the overall
costs of absenteeism to deny requests for leave from employees with disabilities.
Instead of considering the costs versus the benefits of providing leave, employers
often discharge the employee with a disability.
III. ANALYSIS OF TWENTY YEARS OF DECISIONS
Federal opinions addressing requests for leave as an accommodation have been
reviewed to determine how trial courts are applying the different approaches of
appellate courts outlined above. Decisions of district and appellate court opinions
reviewing requests for leave as an accommodation since the passage of the ADA
have been analyzed to determine whether courts follow any detectable pattern in
allowing or dismissing these claims for accommodation.
First, decisions are reviewed to determine whether the leave request was deemed
unreasonable because it was of the amount of leave that had been used previously or
the request was for an indefinite length of leave. Decisions are also specifically
analyzed as to whether a medical opinion was considered and if so, whether that
medical opinion was deemed to be sufficiently definite regarding the employee’s
ability to return to work.
Second, the impact of an employer’s leave policy or FMLA obligations is
determined by reviewing whether policies or the FMLA were considered by the
court, and whether or not the requested leave would exceed the amount of leave
allowed by that employer’s policies or required under the FMLA. Lastly, the
individual characteristics of the employee requesting leave, including the nature of
their impairment, job tenure, job classification, and employer industry classification,
are considered to determine whether more “valuable” employees tend to be more
able to show that their leave request is reasonable or imposes less of a burden, with
value being measure by tenure with the employer and level of position or skills.
Decisions are also reviewed for consideration of the individual job requirements or
duties that would show the undue hardship imposed by leave as an accommodation.
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A. The Data
The data for analysis consist of all three hundred and fifty-three disability claim
appellate decisions in federal courts since the ADA came into effect in 1992 through
December 2012, including seventy-seven appellate court decisions and two hundred
and seventy-six district court decisions. The data are considered complete for the
identified time frame. These decisions were included in the analysis because an
employee’s request for leave as an accommodation was denied by the employer and
the court’s decision addressed whether that leave would have been a reasonable
accommodation or not. Judgment was entered in favor of the employer in 68.8% of
the district court opinions and in 85.7% of the appellate court opinions.
Although the data were collected on court decisions, the unit of analysis can be
considered to be the individual plaintiff. Accordingly, the analysis includes a number
of demographic and case detail parameters including type of impairment, years of
service, type of employer, and position skill level. In addition to corresponding
outcomes and court-recorded details, the data included details on both the plaintiffs
and the defendants gleaned from the court documents. Related to the request for
accommodation, the analysis includes the amount of prior leave taken (in weeks),
whether the amount of leave requested as an accommodation was fixed or indefinite,
whether FMLA obligations and employer leave policies were considered, whether
the amount of leave exceeded that allowed by the employer’s policy (if any), and
whether health care provider input was considered by the court. A full list of raw
variables and descriptions appears in Appendix Table 1.
There is no uniform data collection requirement for ADA cases beyond what is
necessary for the documentation of the claim. As such, a good number of the
observations were missing one or more of the far ranging data fields. In fact, of the
entire set, with each observation having fifty or more fields, only some sixty-five
cases included every possible field collected. In order for the data set to lend itself to
regression modeling, a missing data strategy was called for. The strategy utilized in
this analysis was to utilize separate categories for missing data as needed—this
permitted full incorporation of all observations with incomplete fields. This allows
for the inclusion of the maximum number of observations while not discarding
valuable observations that might be missing only a small portion of the fifty or more
fields of interest.
B. Statistical Model
A logistic model is employed to examine the statistical connection between the
outcome variable, motions for summary judgment finding that the requested leave
was or was not a reasonable accommodation, and the explanatory variables. We
defined the key outcome of interest as Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ). This
binary variable represents whether requested leave is deemed as reasonable
accommodation or not, with zero representing a ruling favorable to the plaintiff
(employee) and one, indicating a finding for the defendant (employer). Unknown
values (as noted above) were given an additional category within each variable
where they occurred. It was important to fully utilize all observations, as the
observations for which court documents did not permit definition of certain
characteristics were nonetheless informative. N.B., only categorical variables appear
in this model as specified. The full logistic regression results and variables appear in
Appendix Table 2.
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C. Analysis
Overall, employees seeking leave as an accommodation succeeded in surviving a
motion for summary judgment in 27.2% of the claims reviewed. As can be seen from
Table 1, in the two hundred and seventy-six trial court opinions, the employer
prevailed in one hundred and ninety of two hundred and seventy-six cases (68.8% of
the time), and in the seventy-seven appellate court decisions, the employer prevailed
in seventy-two of eighty-three cases (86.7% of the time). Outcomes were
differentiated based on whether decisions occurred either before or after the Supreme
Court’s 2002 Barnett decision,295 to determine if the Court’s consideration of
reasonableness of accommodations had any effect. Outcomes showed similar
percentages of successful motions for summary judgment for the employer in the
pre- and post- April 2002 periods, 74.8% and 71.7%, respectively, and the regression
results showed that the Barnett decision was not a significant factor influencing
whether or not leave was deemed reasonable.
There was a wide variation in the treatment of cases depending on the Circuit
Court in which the claims arose, ranging from courts in the Ninth Circuit finding for
employers 48% of the time and the First Circuit with 50%, contrasted against courts
in the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, which decided in favor of employers in 96.8%
and 100% of cases, respectively. The number of cases handled varied, as would the
types of cases. The significance of circuit court identified by the logit regression
model ranges from p≤0.002 in the case of the Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts to
almost one, as in the case of the Eleventh and D.C. Circuit Courts. This suggests that
the variety of approaches to these types of claims across different circuit courts, as
described in the previous section, may be having a significant impact on employees’
success in obtaining leave as an accommodation.
Decisions were analyzed to determine the impact of individual employee and
employer characteristics on the reasonableness of leave as an accommodation. It is
important to note that court decisions did not discuss any of these factors (years of
service, professional skill level or industry category) in determining the
reasonableness of a request for leave. These factors were analyzed to determine if
those factors may be having an unstated effect on those determinations.
Years of service had a significant effect on court decisions. Years of service was
divided into three categories: 0-4 years, 5-15 years, and over 15 years. With 0-4
years as the reference, the 5-15 years of service category proved to be the most
significant in favor of the plaintiff, while those with over 15 years found favorable
outcomes less likely, when compared to employees with less than five years of
experience. The corresponding p-values were 0.043 and 0.307, respectively. This
suggests that some value may be placed on employees who have undergone on the
job training or acquired job-related expertise compared to newer employees, while
the oldest employees may be seen as less likely to be able to return to work.
There was some variation in outcome based on the professional skill level of the
employee. In the sample, 25.2% of the plaintiffs were unskilled workers, 31.7% were
semi-skilled workers, 15% skilled, and 21% professionals. Compared to unskilled
workers (the reference category), professional workers were significantly more
likely to receive a favorable outcome, with a p-value of .047. The skilled and semiskilled categories, while trending similarly, were not significant, however.
295
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The coarse industry classifications outcomes did not appear to vary greatly and
statistical significance was wanting. Industries were grouped as follows: agricultureconstruction-manufacturing (19.6%); transportation-communication-wholesale-retail
(22.7%); and finance-real estate-services (41.5%). A combined general category
accounted for the remaining 16.2%. The greater prevalence of decisions in favor of
employers was in the transportation-communication-wholesale-retail and the
agriculture-mining-construction-manufacturing categories, with 77.5% and 75.4% of
outcomes favorable to employers. The finance-real estate-services category had
71.2%. The unique general category, added to include court cases that indicated a
combination of industries involved, had the lowest rate of success for employers
(64.9%). None of the categories proved to be statically significant.
The decisions were also analyzed for the effect of the type of impairment(s)
reported by the plaintiffs. Like the other individual characteristics discussed above,
none of the decisions analyzed discussed the impact of a particular impairment on
the determination of reasonableness, beyond discussions of the length of leave
already used or needed by the employee with that impairment. It is interesting that of
the cases analyzed, 54.9% involved plaintiffs with multiple impairments, which was
a significant factor (p=.072) in court decisions finding claims to be unreasonable.
Fully 78.4% of the rulings in cases involving multiple impairments were in favor of
the employer.
A chronic injury, such as a back condition, was identified in 23.2% of the claims
and was significantly associated with positive outcomes for employers. The
claimant’s impairment was described as work related in 20.1% of the claims, which
was associated with positive outcomes for plaintiffs but was not significant. Neither
the presence of chronic non-life-threatening conditions such as asthma, present in
42.2% of the claims, nor chronic life-threatening conditions, such as cancer, present
in 14.2% of the claims, affected outcomes significantly. Although both led to a
slightly lower rate of decisions for employers (69.8% vs. 75.3% and 68.0% vs.
73.7%), the effect was not statistically significant in the logistic model.
It is noteworthy that the presence of multiple disabilities or chronic injury may
wield a confounding effect over claimant outcomes. Claimants not limited by
multiple disabilities experienced a significantly higher occurrence of favorable
outcomes (33.3%) compared to those who had multiple disabilities (21.6%). The
latter was slightly significant, (p=0.072) in favor of employers. This may be due to
difficulties in the attribution of the disabilities or, perhaps, a conclusion that the
several disabilities would be more difficult to surmount. The absence of chronic
injury, while it did lead to claimant-favorable outcomes (30.7% vs. 15.9%), was
found to have moderate statistical significance in the logistic regression model.
(p=0.088)The confounding effect of multiple or chronic injuries seemed to push
claimant outcomes in the same direction in both cases. Where the court noted
whether the injury was work-related, this effect was not significant in the model.
In the 30% of the claims analyzed involving a plaintiff with a mental illness, that
impairment proved to be a significant factor in decisions favoring the employer
(p=0.055). In the presence of mental illness, 79.2% of the motions for summary
judgment were granted for the employer, while 70.0% of cases were decided in favor
of the employer when mental illness was not established. This effect, similar in
direction to that of multiple disability (and chronic injury), was somewhat smaller in
magnitude.
Personality disorders were present in 16.1% of the cases, while alcohol or drug
addictions were presented in 2.5% of the claims. None of these impairments favored
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the plaintiff in the outcomes of court decisions since the results in favor of
employers happened in 71.9% and 77.8% and respectively, without statistical
significance.
Among the personal characteristics, chronic injury and mental illness were the
only factors to persist statistically in the logistic regression model, all with α<0.10.
The other items of personal information considered, to include personality disorder
and alcohol/drug problems, did not persist statistically. Moreover, their impact on
the raw data was also relatively small.
Given the focus of appellate court reported decisions on the length of leave being
taken by an employee with a disability,296 the decisions were analyzed based on how
much leave a plaintiff had used before the current request for leave as an
accommodation. In three hundred and thirty-one or more than 92% of the decisions,
the court noted the amount of leave taken prior to the current accommodation
request, which was divided in these categories: 0 weeks, 1-12 weeks, 13-52 weeks,
and more than 52 weeks. Generally, the more leave taken, the more likely the
employer is to prevail. Consideration of this factor was significant overall in favor of
employers. Surprisingly, the amount of leave taken was not significant for most of
these categories. The 1-12 weeks and 13-52 weeks categories were associated with
results in favor of employers but were not a significant factor. Only the prior use of
more than 52 weeks of leave was a significant factor in outcomes for employers.
This suggests that employees who have used a relatively short amount of leave in the
past may be able to convince a court that additional leave is a reasonable
accommodation, but the use of more than one year of leave in the past will definitely
have a negative effect on outcomes for plaintiffs seeking approval of even more
leave as an accommodation.
It is interesting that two hundred and twenty-five, or over 63%, of the decisions
involved a claim for leave as an accommodation without noting or considering the
amount of additional leave being sought. This is in part because 68.3% of the
requests were for leave of an indefinite duration, which were treated as lacking an
amount of leave being sought. In the remaining one hundred and twenty-eight
decisions that specifically considered the amount of leave requested as an
accommodation, some of these amounts proved to be more significant than the
amount of leave used by the plaintiffs in the past. These requests were divided into
these categories: 0-4 weeks, 5-15 weeks, 16-52 weeks, and 52-500 weeks. 78.6% of
the cases favored the employer when 5 to 15 weeks of leave were offered as
accommodation. In the case of plaintiffs with 16 to 52 weeks of leave, 72.4% of the
decisions favor the employer. And absolutely all the claims seeking more than 52
weeks of accommodation resulted in negative outcomes for the employees. The
categories of 5-15 weeks and 16-52 weeks were significantly associated with
judgments in favor of the employer, with the greatest effect coming from leave of
more than 52 weeks. As expected, this suggests that employers and courts are more
reluctant to deem future leave to be reasonable as its length surpasses one year.
However, the effect of a request for 16-52 weeks of leave was less pronounced than
a request for 5-15 weeks of leave.
Given the analysis of these types of claims in the appellate courts, one would
expect that the definiteness of the amount of leave requested as an accommodation
as well as the scheduling of a need for leave would both have a positive effect for
296
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employees seeking leave as an accommodation.297 Decisions were analyzed based on
whether the amount of leave sought as an accommodation was of a definite or
indefinite duration, and whether or not the leave was unscheduled, such as calling in
the morning of scheduled work. In the sample, 31.7% of the cases included definite
amount of leaves and 22.7% involved unscheduled leave. In the analysis of the
cases, a need for a definite amount of leave was positively associated with a decision
that the leave request was reasonable. When the amount of leave needed was
indefinite, 78.8% of the cases were decided in favor of the employer, and when they
were definite, this percentage decreased to 59.8%. In contrast, the use of leave on an
unscheduled basis was positively associated with judgments for the employer but
was not a statistically significant factor in the logistic model.
Decisions were also analyzed regarding the consideration of health care provider
input supporting the need for leave. Courts considered whether the plaintiff had the
support of a health care provider to justify the need for leave in one hundred and
thirteen or 32% of the claims reviewed. When healthcare providers’ input was not
considered, courts ruled in favor of employers in 72.9% of the cases. If a health care
provider’s opinion was considered, the determination of reasonableness often turned
on whether the health care provider was able to provide a definite opinion as to when
the employee will be able to return to work. Where the opinion of a health care
provider was considered, courts found this opinion to be sufficiently definite in forty,
or 35.4% of those cases. Compared to decisions where a health care providers’
opinion was not considered, a definite opinion as to an employee’s ability to return
was significantly favorable to plaintiffs, resulting in judgments for the plaintiffs in
57.5% of the cases with a p-value of 0.002. In contrast, a finding that the health care
provider’s opinion was not sufficiently definite was significantly associated with
outcomes for employers. Employers prevailed in 89% of the claims where the health
care provider’s opinion was considered but was considered to lack a definite date of
return, with high statistical significance (p=0.01).
Decisions were also analyzed to determine whether the amount leave sought as
an accommodation would exceed the leave available under the Family & Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) or under an employer’s own leave policy. Employer policies
were expected to be a significant factor in the determination of whether leave was a
reasonable accommodation, based on appellate court deference to these policies in
determining the reasonableness of a leave request.298 Employer policies were a
significant factor in the determination of whether leave was a reasonable
accommodation. Of the decisions analyzed, the employer’s leave policy was
considered in 28.6% of those decisions. The court’s failure to consider an
employer’s leave policy was a statistically significant factor in decisions finding that
the leave was reasonable.
In claims where the employer’s leave policy was considered, the leave sought as
an accommodation exceeded the leave allowed by the employer’s policy in eightytwo of the cases, compared to nineteen claims where the leave sought was less than
allowed by an employer’s policy. Consideration of employer policies on leave was a
significant factor in favor of the employee for cases in which the policy was not
exceeded (p=0.007). When the employer’s leave policy was exceeded, consideration
297
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of employer policy regarding leave tended to support outcomes in favor of the
employer, though not significantly.
Decisions were also analyzed to determine whether the fact that an employer’s
satisfaction of leave requirements under the FMLA was a significant factor in
determining that any additional leave would be an unreasonable accommodation.299
The employer’s FMLA requirements were only considered in thirty-seven or 10.5%
of the decisions. The actual outcomes of the claims were not well differentiated—
with 72.5% and 75.7% favorable outcomes for the employer, respectively. Although
the consideration of FMLA obligations was positively associated with decisions in
favor of employers, this consideration was not a significant factor.
Decisions were also analyzed to determine whether the court considered the
employee’s individual job duties or other circumstances. Given some courts
reluctance to consider such individualized factors, it was not surprising that only
24.9% of the studied cases considered the duties or other individual circumstances.
Of the decisions where such individual factors were considered, courts found that
leave as an accommodation was reasonable and required in 43.2% of the claims,
which was highly significant for the model in outcomes in favor of the plaintiff.
(p=0.005). Where this factor was not considered, employers were successful in
defeating accommodation claims in 78% of the claims.
D. Discussion
Considered together, we have an interesting combination of results. The central
theme of these analyses is whether and to what degree policy details and claimant
parameters affect appellate decisions for disability claims. The additional question of
whether the Barnett ruling significantly affected appellate decisions, even if not put
to rest, might now be viewed differently. In our sample, 65.2% of the cases occurred
before the Barnett decision, but it certainly did not impact outcomes as strongly as
expected.
While it is reassuring that some of the explanatory variables did not significantly
drive decisions in a statistical sense, it is clear that courts do matter, and that is not
reassuring. Further it is difficult to take the position that the sample size is a problem
in this case. The number of explanatory variables considered was practically
exhaustive and as large as the sample size would permit. Among the data that could
be included in any further follow-up to this work would be expanded demographic
detail, to include minority status, and possibly a larger time window that would
permit analysis of changes over time. This would be particularly informative given
the evolving state of labor and the present market challenges.
Further, the apparent inclusion of multiple factors in support of the claimant case
would indicate that the explicit ambiguities of the law that permit consideration of
undue hardship on the employers might extend to consideration of claimant
individual circumstances as well. What is clear is that the legal grey zones intended
to foster economically rational decisions incorporates both employer and claimant
factors to a significant degree in some cases.
Lastly, and perhaps the most important result from a policy point of view, we
found that health care provider input, when considered, did weigh heavily in the
decisions of the court. Similarly, circumstances in which the leave sought exceeded
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established employer policies were also differentiated statistically. It would seem
that both policy and specialized input weigh heavily on the processes of the courts.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION
Both employers and employees with disabilities can benefit from clearer
guidance on how much leave should be provided as a reasonable accommodation,
and under which circumstances such leave could cause the employer an undue
hardship. In various current circuit court opinions, the reasoning focuses on the
amount of leave taken prior to the current request for leave and whether the
employee expects to return at a specific time in the fairly near future. A minority of
appellate courts go a bit farther and consider whether the employer’s leave policies
or perhaps the FMLA would require provision of the requested leave.
The analysis of trial and appellate court decisions was surprising in that smaller
amounts of past leave taken by an employee were not significant determinants of
whether the leave was deemed reasonable under the ADA. Only when the prior use
of leave exceeded one year did it become significant. Similarly, the fact that prior
leave usage was unscheduled was not a significant factor in outcomes for employers.
This suggests that although appellate reasoning often mentions the length of prior
leave or its unscheduled use as important factors in a reasonableness analysis, courts
do not necessarily dismiss claims because of these factors. Therefore, employers
should not deny requests for future leave based on how much leave an employee has
used in the past or the fact that its use was unscheduled.
With respect to an employee’s future need for leave, the amount needed appears
to be significant, but the indefiniteness of the need by itself does not appear to be
significant. The significance of the specific amount of time needed by the employee
in the future shows that employers should pay close attention to the amount of leave
that employees are expected to need. However, a need for a longer amount of leave
does not necessarily make the request unreasonable. A definite length of time for
future leave favored plaintiffs but surprisingly, indefiniteness was not a significant
determinant of whether the leave was reasonable. Therefore, an employee’s inability
to articulate an exact amount of future leave that is needed should not result in the
denial of the request for leave.
Like the length of leave requested, courts’ consideration of health care provider
input on the length of leave necessary to enable the plaintiff to return was extremely
influential. Conversely, the unavailability or a court’s failure to consider such
information worked significantly in favor of employers. If the health care provider
provided a definite opinion regarding when the employee would be able to return to
work, the plaintiff was even more likely to be able to show that the leave was
reasonable. This suggests that employers should request and consider carefully the
opinion of a treating health care provider before determining whether a leave request
is reasonable.
The influence of employer leave policies was a significant result. Courts appear
to be following the logic of one expert, Stephen Befort, who would allow employers
to rely on a documented leave policy to justify the denial of leave as an
accommodation.300 The analysis of ADA decisions since 1992 suggests that courts
are following this logic: Recognition that a request for leave exceeds an employer’s
policy favors the employer, while a court’s failure to consider leave policies works
300

Befort, supra note 6, at 471.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2014

47

484

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:437

significantly in the employee’s favor. If the leave requested exceeds the amount
provided in an employer’s policy, the employer is even more likely to be able to
show that the leave is unreasonable. Unfortunately, this approach ignores the
individualized analysis that is required for accommodation requests under the ADA.
In addition, this weight on employer’s policies without any examination of how
these policies have been interpreted or applied in the past fails to apply the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Barnett, which warned that policies should not be used to
avoid the duty to accommodate if they have not been applied consistently in the
past.301 Even if the employer’s policies are applied consistently, this approach allows
and even encourages employers to adopt very restrictive leave policies that can then
be used to show that an employee’s request for leave as accommodation is
unreasonable.
With respect to individual employee characteristics, it was encouraging that both
years of service and profession had a significant effect on determinations of
reasonableness. Factors such as length of service, professional skill level and
industry classification, as well as some measure of how difficult the employee would
be to replace, would be relevant to economists’ determinations of reasonableness and
hardship. Indeed our analysis of decisions since 1992 shows that some employees’
skill levels and experience of 5-15 years in length are significant when considered by
the court. But it is important to note that while profession was often mentioned by a
reviewing court, none of the courts discussed this as a determinant factor. Moreover,
more than 7% of the courts did not even mention the plaintiff’s profession in their
opinions. Similarly, while length of service was mentioned in 91.5% of the
decisions, none of the courts explicitly gave experience as the reason for finding that
leave would be a reasonable accommodation.
Some other individual circumstances were surprisingly significant. An employee
with a mental illness, a chronic injury, or multiple impairments is significantly less
likely to successfully challenge the denial of leave as an accommodation, even
controlling for possibly related factors such as length of leave used in the past. This
suggests that preconceived notions about either the effects of such impairments or
the value of employees with such impairment, or both, have influenced courts’
determinations of whether leave for these employees would be a reasonable
accommodation. This effect also suggests that both employers and reviewing courts
are making assumptions about employees based on the extent or type of their
impairments, thereby defeating one of the essential purposes of the ADA.
The decisions that carefully considered the opinion of a health care provider or
the individual duties of an employee seeking leave show the significant impact of
such individualized information on determinations of reasonableness. Unfortunately,
health care provider input was only considered in less than a third of the decisions,
and individual duties or other factors were only considered in less than 25% of the
decisions. Employees seeking leave as an accommodation should present
information to both their employers and the courts regarding their health care
provider’s opinion on their future ability to return to work, as well as individual
work circumstances and potential solutions which would make the leave relatively
less burdensome. Moreover, employers seeking to fulfill their accommodation

301

US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002); see supra text accompanying
notes 212-14.
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requirements and courts seeking to fully enforce the ADA should be sure to consider
such information in making reasonableness and undue hardship determinations.
In reviewing claims for leave as a reasonable accommodation, courts and the
EEOC should stress the obligation of employers to consider the individual
circumstances surrounding accommodation requests. This approach has been
required by the Supreme Court.302 Moreover, this approach would encourage
employers to weigh the benefits against the costs of retaining an employee who is
seeking the accommodation. Such an analysis would not only fulfill the individual
assessment requirements of the ADA, but would also encourage economically
rational decisions by employers, including consideration of the costs of hiring and
training a replacement for the employee who seeks the leave.
An individual analysis of the reasonableness and the undue hardship posed by a
request for leave as an accommodation may lead to different interpretations of the
facts involved. In particular, the reasonableness of a request for leave as an
accommodation often turns on interpretation of facts such as the effect of the leave
on the employer’s operations as well as facts which are unknown at the time the
employer considers the accommodation. One way to approach this dispute over
factual interpretations would be to apply the logic of the “honest belief” defense,
which has been relied upon as a defense in other types of discrimination claims. If
there are issues of fact regarding the basis for an employee’s discharge, the honest
belief defense allows the employer to avoid liability based on its interpretation of the
facts known at the time of the discharge.303
Under the honest belief defense, if an employer relies on particularized facts
which later turn out to be mistaken, foolish, trivial or baseless, that reliance is not
discriminatory,304 if the decision was “reasonably informed and considered.”305 The
Sixth Circuit has explained that it “will not blindly assume that an employer’s
description of its reasons is honest.”306 Therefore, “[w]hen the employee is able to
produce sufficient evidence to establish that the employer failed to make a
reasonably informed and considered decision before taking its adverse employment
action, thereby making its decisional process ‘unworthy of credence,’ then any
reliance placed by the employer in such a process cannot be said to be honestly
held.”307
This honest belief defense relies on the extent of the employer’s investigation
showing that the employer made “a reasonably informed and considered

302
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987)); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 569 (1999); Sutton
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
303

Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807-08 (1998).

304

Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (at time of discharge,
employer documentation of substandard performance and poor behavior).
305
Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 708-09 (6th Cir. 2006) (employer relied on
information regarding plaintiff’s performance and harassment of coworkers based on
employee interviews).
306

Id.

307

Id. at 708 (quoting Smith, 155 F.3d at 807-08).
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decision.”308 For example, an employer showed an honest belief that a Plaintiff was
unable to perform the physical requirements of her job duties based on reports from
other employees and employee and health records documenting her inability to
perform the duties.309
Under the honest belief defense, the employer has the burden of identifying the
particularized facts it relied upon in taking an adverse action.310 An employer failed
to establish a honest belief, for example, when it discharged an employee shortly
after he was hurt by an accident at work, since the supervisor who discharged him
did not question him about the incident and the employer could not produce any
documentation of any investigation of the accident or evidence of the specific facts
known by the supervisor at the time of the discharge.311
This same approach could be applied to employers’ consideration of requests for
leave as an accommodation. If the employer engages in a reasonable investigation of
the employee’s potential for returning to work and an analysis of the actual costs of
extending the leave, then the employer should be able to rely on the facts known at
the time the accommodation is considered. Conversely, if the facts suggest that the
employee may be able to return to work in a fairly short or definite amount of time,
or that the costs of replacing that employee may exceed the costs associated with
extending the leave, then the employer should grant the accommodation.
This approach is consistent with the proposed requirements in the Working
Families Flexibility Act, which would require certain procedures before an employer
responds to a request for leave as an accommodation.312 This Act would require that
an employer respond to a request for leave with a written decision that explains the
reason for any denial, including the limitations posed by the resources of the
employer, the costs posed by the change in terms, potential effects of the change on
customers, and other managerial concerns.313
Placement of some burden on the employer to show that leave as an
accommodation would not be reasonable or imposes an undue hardship is also
appropriate since a uniform policy against use of leave could well have a disparate
impact on employees with disabilities. Such a qualification standard that screens out
or tends to screen out an individual with a disability must be proven by the employer
308
Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard Care, LLC, 692 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir. 2012) (employer
conducted reasonable investigation into plaintiff’s performance); see also Davis v. City of
Clarksville, 492 F. App’x 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2012) (employer investigation into plaintiff’s
dishonesty was reasonable where investigator was unbiased and interviewed numerous
witnesses, hearing allowed Plaintiff to present his version).
309

MacDonald-Bass v. J.E. Johnson Contracting, Inc., 493 F. App’x 718, 726 (6th Cir.
2012).
310
Clay v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2007) (summary
judgment for employer denied where employer did not show belief was “reasonably based on
particularized facts”).
311

Brooks v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 478 Fed. Appx. 934, 943 (6th Cir. 2012); see also
Ramey v. Vacument Corp., No. 2:09-CV-196, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9121, at *17 (E.D.
Tenn. Jan. 26, 2012) (discharge for abuse of sick leave not based on honest belief when based
on brief observation of plaintiff and timing of doctor’s visits).
312

Arnow-Richman, supra note 73, at 1110.

313

Id.
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to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and performance cannot be
achieved through reasonable accommodation.314 Congress expressed its intention in
the ADA that an employer can insist upon across-the-board qualification standards
only if those standards “provide an accurate measure of an applicant’s actual ability
to perform the job . . . .”315
Leave as an accommodation is an important tool for admitting and retaining
employees with disabilities in the workforce. To be an effective tool, however,
employers and courts cannot continue to deny requests for leave or discharge
employees who have taken leave that exceeds an individual employer’s policy or
some abstract notion of how much leave is “too much.” Instead, employers should
rely on an individual employee’s health care provider as well as factors related to the
job in question to determine the reasonableness and hardship potentially caused by a
particular request for leave. Like employers asserting the honest belief defense,
employers taking such an individualized approach should be able to rely on the
information available to them. But decisions that will greatly affect an employee’s
future in the workforce should not be made based on assumptions or a lack of
information. Such decisions are not economically efficient and should be deemed
discriminatory.

314

29 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(6) (West 2014).

315

H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 42 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 465,
1990 WL 121680.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Appellate Decision
No
Yes
Circuit Court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
D.C.
Years of Service
Zero through four years
Five through 15 years
Over 15 years
Leave Taken before this Request
Zero
1-12 weeks
13-52 weeks
1 Year and More
Weeks of Leave Offered as
Accommodation
Unknown
Zero through four
Five through 15
16 through 52
52 through 500
Professional Skill Level
Unskilled
Semi-Skilled
Skilled
Professional
Coarse Groupings of Industry
Classifications
Combination
Ag/Mining/Construction/Manuf
Transp/Commun/Wholesale/Retail
Finance/Real Estate/Services
FMLA Considered?
No
Yes
Chronic Non-Life Threatening
No
Yes
Chronic Life Threatening
No
Yes
MULTDISAB
No
Yes

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol62/iss2/8

Frequency (%)
270 (76.5)
83 (23.5)
Frequency (%)
20 (5.7)
32 (9.1)
37 (10.5)
26 (7.4)
29 (8.2)
41 (11.6)
64 (18.1)
31 (8.8)
25 (7.1)
28 (7.9)
18 (5.1)
2 (0.6)
Frequency (%)
117 (33.1)
148 (41.9)
58 (16.4)
Frequency (%)
9 (2.5)
134 (38.0)
141 (39.9)
47 (13.3)
Frequency (%)

MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
185 (72.0)
72 (86.7)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
10 (50)
19 (59.4)
22 (59.5)
22 (84.6)
24 (82.8)
27 (65.9)
50 (78.1)
30 (96.8)
12 (48)
21 (75)
18 (100)
2 (100)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
85 (72.6)
102 (68.9)
47 (81.0)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
5 (55.6)
94 (70.1)
106 (75.2)
40 (85.1)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)

225 (63.7)
69 (19.5)
28 (7.9)
29 (8.2)
2 (0.6)
Frequency (%)
89 (25.2)
112 (31.7)
53 (15)
74 (21)
Frequency (%)

176 (78.2)
35 (52.2)
22 (78.6)
21 (72.4)
2 (100)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
66 (74.2)
82 (73.2)
42 (79.2)
51 (68.9)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)

57 (16.2)
69 (19.6)
80 (22.7)
146 (41.5)
Frequency (%)
316 (89.5)
37 (10.5)
Frequency (%)
194 (55)
149 (42.2)
Frequency (%)
293 (83)
50 (14.2)
Frequency (%)
156 (45.1)
190 (54.9)

38 (66.7)
52 (75.4)
62 (77.5)
104 (71.2)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
229 (72.5)
28 (75.7)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
146 (75.3)
104 (69.8)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
216 (73.7)
34 (68.0)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
104 (66.7)
149 (78.4)
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Chronic Injury
No
Yes
Mental Illness
No
Yes
Personality Disorder
No
Yes
Alcohol/Drugs
No
Yes
Work Related?
No
Yes
Post 4-29-02
No
Yes
Amount Definite
No
Yes
Unscheduled Leave
No
Yes
Individual Circumstances
Considered
No
Yes
Health Care Policy
Considered Not Sufficiently
Definite
Considered Sufficiently Definite
Not Considered
Whether Leave Policy was
Considered
Leave Exceeded Policy
Leave Did Not Exceed Policy
Not Considered
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Frequency (%)
261 (73.9)
82 (23.2)
Frequency (%)
237 (67.1)
106 (30)
Frequency (%)
286 (81)
57 (16.1)
Frequency (%)
334 (94.6)
9 (2.5)
Frequency (%)
273 (77.3)
71 (20.1)
Frequency (%)
123 (34.8)
230 (65.2)
Frequency (%)
241 (68.3)
112 (31.7)
Frequency (%)
273 (77.3)
80 (22.7)
Frequency (%)

MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
181 (69.3)
69 (84.1)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
166 (70.0)
84 (79.2)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
209 (73.1)
41 (71.9)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
245 (72.8)
7 (77.8)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
195 (71.4)
56 (78.9)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
92 (74.8)
165 (71.7)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
190 (78.8)
67 (59.8)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
200 (73.3)
57 (71.3)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)

264 (74.8)
88 (24.9)
Frequency (%)
73 (20.7)

206 (78.0)
50 (56.8)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)
65 (89.0)

40 (11.3)
240 (68.0)
Frequency (%)

17 (42.5)
175 (72.9)
MSJ for ER = 1 (%)

82 (23.2)
19 (5.4)
252 (71.4)

62 (75.6)
7(36.8)
188 (74.6)
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Table 2: Logistic Regression
Variables in the Equation

B

Appellate decision for ER

2.519

S.E.
0.635

Circuit Court (reference 1st)

Wald

Df

Sig.

15.731

1

.000

29.318

11

.002

Exp(B)

95% C.I. for Exp(B)
Lower

Upper

12.416

3.576

43.108

11.674

2nd Circuit

0.866

0.812

1.137

1

.286

2.377

0.484

3rd Circuit

.539

0.824

.429

1

.513

1.715

0.341

8.621

4th Circuit

3.922

1.079

13.218

1

.000

50.504

6.096

418.383

5th Circuit

2.981

1.025

8.452

1

.004

19.700

2.641

146.937

6th Circuit

1.698

0.853

3.963

1

.047

5.461

1.027

29.049

7th Circuit

2.453

0.851

8.311

1

.004

11.619

2.193

61.566

8th Circuit

5.687

1.797

10.016

1

.002

295.071

8.715

9990.487

9th Circuit

.395

0.917

.185

1

.667

1.484

0.246

8.958

10th Circuit

1.595

0.952

2.806

1

.094

4.928

0.762

31.852

11th Circuit

22.210

8091.687

.000

1

.998

4.42E+09

0.000

.

12th Circuit

22.223

2.77E+04

.000

1

.999

4.48E+09

0.000

.

8.686

3

.034

Years of Service (reference 0-4)
5-15 Years

-.930

0.459

4.113

1

.043

0.394

0.161

0.969

Over 15 Years

0.647

0.633

1.044

1

.307

1.909

0.552

6.597

11.880

4

.018
13.340

Leave taken before this request
(reference 0 weeks)
1-12 Weeks

.363

1.137

.102

1

.750

1.437

0.155

13-52 Weeks

0.825

1.141

0.523

1

.470

2.283

0.244

21.366

1 Year and More

2.246

1.336

2.826

1

.093

9.446

0.689

129.503

17.428

4

.002

Leave offered as accommodation
(reference 0-4 weeks)
5-15 Weeks

3.005

0.919

10.701

1

.001

20.179

3.335

122.109

16-52 Weeks

1.916

0.785

5.962

1

.015

6.791

1.459

31.602

52-500 Weeks

21.991

2.56E+04

0.000

1

.999

3.55E+09

0.000

.

8.220

4

.084

Professional skill level (reference
unskilled)
Semi-skilled
Skilled
Professional

-0.744

0.549

1.833

1

.176

0.475

0.162

1.395

-.577

0.673

0.735

1

.391

0.561

0.150

2.100

-1.155

0.581

3.958

1

.047

0.315

0.101

0.983

2.817

3

.421

Coarse industry grouping (reference
general)
Ag/Mining/Construction/Manuf
Transp/Commun/Wholesale/Ret
ail
Finance/Real Estate/Services

1.074

0.676

2.519

1

.112

2.926

0.777

11.015

.223

0.649

0.118

1

.731

1.250

0.350

4.463

.293

0.552

.282

1

.595

1.341

0.454

3.959

.067

0.650

.011

1

.917

1.070

0.299

3.826

Chronic Non-Life Threatening

-.043

0.530

.007

1

.935

0.958

0.339

2.705

Chronic Life-Threatening

-.025

0.652

.002

1

.969

0.975

0.272

3.496

.758

0.421

3.247

1

.072

2.135

0.936

4.870

Chronic Injury

1.032

0.604

2.919

1

.088

2.806

0.859

9.166

Mental Illness

1.048

0.547

3.672

1

.055

2.852

0.976

8.328

.267

.552

.233

1

.629

1.31E+00

4.42E-01

3.85E+00

FMLA Considered

Multiple Disability

Personality Disorder
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Alcohol/Drugs

1.000

1.288

0.603

1

.437

2.72E+00

2.18E-01

3.39E+01

Work-Related

-.779

.553

1.987

1

.159

4.59E-01

1.55E-01

1.36E+00

Post 4-29-2002

-0.188

0.448

0.176

1

0.675

0.829

0.345

1.994

Amount Definite

-0.611

0.456

1.792

1

0.181

0.543

0.222

1.328

0.007

0.511

0.000

1

0.989

1.007

0.370

2.744

19.133

2

0.000

Unscheduled Leave
Health Care Provider Option
(reference not considered)
Considered not sufficiently
definite
Considered sufficiently definite
Individual circumstances
considered

1.583

0.614

6.645

1

0.010

4.869

1.461

16.220

-1.947

0.629

9.592

1

0.002

0.143

0.042

0.489

-1.268

0.453

7.845

1

0.005

0.281

0.116

0.683

10.453

2

0.005

Leave Exceeding Policy (reference not
considered)
No

-2.412

0.898

7.205

1

0.007

0.090

0.015

0.522

Yes

0.694

0.503

1.903

1

0.168

2.002

0.747

5.371

-2.649

1.515

3.058

1

0.08

0.071

Constant
Cox & Snell R Square

.417

Nagelkerke R Square

.606
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